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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, a new type of settlement emerged in
litigation over patents covering pharmaceutical products. This
phenomenon passed largely unnoticed in most other litigation
contexts, but in the very specific world of pharmaceutical patent
litigation, it has resulted in high-profile cases involving the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC"), the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and
numerous private plaintiffs. Congress has attempted - thus far
unsuccessfully - to provide a legislative solution, and numerous law
professors have debated the issue on the pages of various law
journals. Traditionally, the alleged trespasser on someone else's rights
pays the rights holder to settle the litigation. In these new settlements,
however, it is the rights holder that pays the alleged trespasser. For
these reasons, such settlements have been termed "reverse payment
settlements" or simply "reverse settlements."l
In this Article, I propose a new approach and argue that the
proper way to police these agreements is not by subjecting them to an
antitrust analysis, but by ordering a reexamination of any patent
involved in a reverse settlement. Although the reverse settlements
have been attacked by some commentators,2 the FTC,3 and a number
4
oflegislators as anti-competitive, anti-consumer, and an abuse of the
patent, in my view the question of whether the settlement is pro- or
anti-competitive turns on the strength of the patent and the likely
conclusion of the litigation. The antitrust analysis - especially under
the per se approach advocated by the FTC 5 - simply is not designed
1. See. e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment
Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. LJ. 1303, 1315 (2010) (referring
to the agreements both as "reverse payment settlements" and "reverse settlements");
Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements: Presumptions.
Procedural Burdens. and Covenants Not to Sue Generic Drug Manufacturers, 26 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 141, 156 (2010) (same). Sometimes these
settlements are also referred to as "pay-for-delay" settlements, or "exit payment"
settlements. See. e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New
Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 629,632 (2009);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rulesfor Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L.
REv. 11, 18 (2004).
2. See infra Part IV.D.
3. See infra Part IV.B.
4. See infra Part IVA.
5. See, e.g., in re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 FTC. 956,968 (2003), vacated sub nom.
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (lith Cir. 2005) (while declining to apply a
per se label and purporting to utilize a "rule of reason" analysis, the FTC sought to prohibit
all reverse settlements "except[ing] payments that are limited to litigation costs up to $2
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to address patent scope and validity issues, and therefore cannot
properly differentiate between pro- and anti-competitive settlements.
Instead, because the patent law is designed to address this very
question, it should be relied on to police reverse settlements.
The rise of reverse settlement agreements is a direct consequence
of the incentives created by the Hatch-Waxman Act. On the one hand,
the Act creates an incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge
existing patents without much regard for their strength. As a reward
for such challenges, Hatch-Waxman bestows a 180-day marketing
6
exclusivity period on the first challenger. On the other hand, by
permitting the challenger to retain the exclusivity period irrespective
of the litigation's outcome,7 the Act encourages the challenger to enter
into a settlement agreement which would permit market entry prior to
the patent's expiration. Such agreements would provide for payments
from the patentee to the generic until the date of actual market entry,
while allowing the generic to maintain the economic benefits of the
8
exclusivity period when the market entry finally occurs.
The patentee is also incentivized to settle on similar terms
because a settlement assures monopoly rents for some defined time
9
into the future. While that time may be shorter than the length of the
patent, the settlement insures the patentee against the possibility of
losing the suit and thus losing its monopoly earlier than what the
settlement agreement would provide. )0
In other words, the Act incentivizes the patentee and the
challenger to enter a settlement "involv[ing] a negotiated market entry
date for the generic product" that "typically occurs later than would
have likely occurred if the generic company had prevailed in the
patent dispute [but earlier than the patent expiration date], i.e., the
parties split the remaining patent term.")) On the surface, these
settlements may look like traditional horizontal agreements between
competitors - agreements that have long been held per se illegal

million"); FED. TRADE COMM'N., PAY-FOR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/20l0101I
100ll2payfordelayrpt.pdf(recommending that Congress ban such settlements).
6.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (West 2011); see also infra notes 41-45 and
accompanying text.
7. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
8. See Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494-502 (2007) (defining
reverse settlement agreements).
9. See Laura J. Grebe, Comment, Generic Entry in a Rough Economy- Proposed
Legislation May Ease Health Care Costs, 14 MARQ. IN TELL. PROP. L. REv. 167, 174-75
(2010) (citing in re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187,209-10 n.24 (2d Cir.
2006».
10. See James F. Ponsoldt & W. Hennen Ehrenc1ou, The Antitrust Legality of
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements, 2006 U.ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'y 37, 52.
11. Holman, supra note 8, at 495.
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12
under the antitrust laws. The thrust of the antitrust argument is that
these agreements are detrimental to consumers because they allow the
patentee to unjustifiably maintain monopoly pricingY Further,
because the Hatch-Waxman Act precludes the entry of other generic
companies until the I80-day exclusivity period has expired,
settlements that delay the entry of the first generic also necessarily
14
delay the entry of other generic manufacturers. Consequently, the
antitrust argument goes, reverse settlement agreements are not just
horizontal restraints on trade as between the settling parties, but are in
effect a restraint on trade as between all market participants.
What is missing from the antitrust analysis is the recognition that
settlements are detrimental to consumers only if the generic
challenger would have prevailed in litigation. These settlements serve
to prevent market entry for generic manufacturers and therefore force
consumers to pay higher, monopoly rents for longer periods than they
would have had the suits gone to judgment and the generic
manufacturers prevailed. On the other hand, if the patentee would
have prevailed, then the consumers benefit from a reverse settlement,
as it allows for the generic's entry prior to the expiration of the patent.
Thus, consumers obtain lower, non-monopolistic prices earlier than
they otherwise would have. It is difficult for antitrust law to
distinguish between these two situations. To the extent that the
antitrust approach could take this distinction into account (for
instance, by applying the rule of reason analysis to the settlement), it
would transform the traditional economic arguments into patent
litigation - the very litigation that the settlement between the
patentee and the generic sought to avoid. Thus, even assuming that the
rule of reason antitrust analysis could differentiate between the proand anti-competitive reverse settlements, such an approach would
undermine the raison d'etre for these settlements.
Additionally, the antitrust approach may undermine patent law
uniformity, as presumably whatever findings a district court would
make on antitrust liability could - and would - be appealed. The
appeals, like any other appeal on issues of antitrust law, would likely
be heard by the regional circuit courts of appeals,15 which would then
12. See in re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 905-08 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that reverse settlements are "naked, horizontal restraint[ s1of trade and, as such, per
se illegal").
13. See Sandoval, supra note 1, at 147 (stating the FTC's view '·that such reverse
payment settlements maintain high prices by averting generic competition with a patented
drug, unduly allowing the patent holder to charge monopoly profits").
14. See Uche Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The
PharmaceuticalindustlY, Ethics. and Global Trade, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 203, 249 n.223
(2005) (quoting FAMILIES USA, GETTING ACCESS TO GENERIC DRUGS: A TiMELINE (2002),
available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/genericstimelinef9a4 .pdf).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). The Supreme Court has held that when patent law is
relevant only to the defenses raised, the case does not "arise under" the patent laws, and
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be tasked with evaluating the validity and strength of the patents
underlying the antitrust litigation. This could put the regional circuits
on a collision course with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which is a specialist court with exclusive jurisdiction over
16
patent disputes. Such an outcome would put complicated technical
patent questions in the hands of non-specialist judges, and would run
directly contrary to the congressional desire for uniformity of patent
law throughout the country. 17
In short, the antitrust approach is not a promising solution to the
very real problems raised by reverse settlements. A different solution
must then be used in order to differentiate between pro- and anticompetitive reverse settlements. This solution is found in the patent
law itself.
Part II of this Article focuses on the structure, purpose, and
mechanics of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the understanding of which is
necessary in order to appreciate how the problem of reverse
settlements arises. Part III discusses several leading reverse settlement
cases, each of which has been challenged under antitrust law. This
discussion will illustrate features that are common to such settlements,
as well as the struggle that lawyers and judges face in attempting to
shoehorn the problem of reverse settlements into an antitrust-based
solution.
Part IV describes the response to the reverse settlement issue
from the judicial, executive, and legislative branches. It discusses
academic commentary and offers criticism of the proposals advanced
thus far.
Part V presents a solution to the problem of reverse settlements
by arguing that reverse settlements should trigger the Patent Officeconducted reexamination proceedings. Part V further outlines what
conditions must be satisfied to order the patent into reexamination and
what the scope of the reexamination should be.
Part VI identifies and addresses potential counterarguments to
this approach, and Part VII concludes.

therefore is to be appealed to the regional circuit. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988). That is true "even if the defense is anticipated in the
plaintiffs complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question
truly at issue in the case." Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983» (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if the complaint
against a reverse settlement sounded in antitrust, it would be irrelevant that the only salient
question to the outcome of litigation was the strength of the patent; any appeals would be
heard by the appropriate regional circuit court of appeals.
16. See 28 U.S.CA § 1295 (West 2011).
17. See S. REp. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 11,15 (stating
that "[tlhe creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable
uniformity in this area ofthe law").
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II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
A. The Structure and Purposes of the Act

In 1984, Congress passed a new law that streamlined the approval
process for generic drugs. This law was officially titled the "Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,,,18 but is
19
commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act after its two
2o
principal sponsors in the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The Act had several purposes. First, the Act sought to bring lowercost generic equivalents of patented drugs to market on an expedited
basis and thus make these drugs more widely available to the general
pUblic.21 On the other hand, the Act sought to provide adequate
22
incentives to the manufacturers and developers of pioneer drugs.
Finally, the Act, through encouraging litigation over the patents that
covered these drugs, sought to clear the landscape of invalid patents

18. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417,98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
19. See. e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALEJ. HEALTHPOL'y
L. & ETHICS 717, 727 (2005) ('"In 1984, Congress added two more provisions for FDAadministered market exclusivity in the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Resloration
Act of1984, commonly known as the . Hatch- Waxman Act. "').
20. See Joel Graham, The Legality of Hatch-Waxman Pharmaceutical Settlements: Is the
Terazosin Test the Proper Prescription?, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 429, 429 n.2 (2006) ('"This
Act is typically referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act because of the congressional
sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry Waxman." (quoting Larissa
Burford, Note, In re Cardizem & Valley Drug Co.: The Hatch-Waxman Act, Anticompetitive
Actions. and Regulatory Reform, 19 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 365, 365 n.2 (2004» (internal
quotation marks omitted».
21. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 98th Congo 1 (1984) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res.) ("On the one hand, lower
drug prices - tens of millions of dollars a year in total savings - will flow from increased
generic competition made possible by a new abbreviated new drug application which we
will refer to as ANDA, for off-patent drugs approved after 1962."); see also Ian Jaquette,
Comment, Merck KGaA v.lntegra Lifesciences I, Ltd: Implications of the Supreme Court's
Decisionfor the People Who Matter Most . .. the Consumer, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 10102 (2007) ("Title I of the Act created an abbreviated new drug application ... process
designed to expedite the arrival of generic drugs to the pharmaceutical marketplace by
amending the FDA approval process.").
22. See 130 CONGo REc. 24,430 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Henry
Waxman) ('"The public will benefit twice; by the further incentive for research and
development for new, innovative drugs and by the immediate reduction in drug prices when
a generic is on the market as a competitor."). As further explained by Jaquette:
Congress enacted Title II of the Hatch-Waxman Act as a means of
mitigating the distortion to the patent term created by 1he FDA
regulatory process .... Congress reasoned that restoring some of the
lost patent life would maintain profit incentives for pioneering drug
manufactures and thereby ensure continued innovation in the
pharmaceutical and medical device industries.
Jaquette, supra note 21, at 102.
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by providing a "bounty" to generics firms that challenged the validity
or enforceability of the patents covering brand-name drugs.23
Prior to the passage of the Act, a generic drug manufacturer faced
two hurdles in getting the drug on the market. First, the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act required the generic manufacturer to conduct its
own separate tests and studies to prove that its drug was safe and
efficacious, even if the drug was an exact copy of the brand-name
24
counterpart. The generic applicant could not rely on data already
compiled by the brand-name manufacturer?5 The Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") then had to conduct its usual evaluation of
the application in much the same way as when the pioneer drug was
approved?6 Second, under the Patent Act and case law interpreting
the same, generic manufacturers were not permitted to use the pioneer
drug as a template for designing their own generic equivalents. Such a
23. See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., PATENT
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 ('"THE
HATCH- WAXMAN ACT") 27 (2005). As Schacht and Thomas put it:
The 1984 Act provides prospective manufacturers of generic
pharmaceuticals with a reward for challenging the patent associated
with an approved pharmaceutical. The reward consists of a 180-day
generic drug exclusivity period awarded to the first generic applicant
to file a paragraph IV certification. This provision is intended to
encourage generic applicants to challenge a listed patent for an
approved drug product.
id.; see also Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA's Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 54
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 195, 199 (1999) ('"The 180-day exclusivity provision is intended as an
incentive for the first generic applicant to challenge a listed patent for the innovator drug
product."). The same "bounty" also extends to challenges to the infringement allegations. 21
U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B}-(C) (West 2011). However, successful challenges to validity or
enforceability are especially important because these challenges permanently remove the
patentee's ability to litigate on that patent See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. V. Univ. of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313,332-33 (1971); in re Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., LLC, Patent Litig.,
536 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
24. See Bret Dickey et aI., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the
Pharmaceutical industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367,371 (2010) ('"Before Hatch- Waxman,
the FDA also required generic manufacturers to conduct their own safety and efficacy
studies .... "); Jeff Thomas, Schering-Plough and In re Tamoxifen: Lawful Reverse
Payments in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 18 (2007) (stating
that prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, "the generic manufacturer was required
to undertake full clinical trials to prove safety and efficacy").
25. Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
171, 174-75 (2008) (,"Generic manufacturers could not use the NDA holder's data to
demonstrate safety and efficacy, and were forced to conduct their own clinical trials:').
26. See M. Howard Morse, Settlement of intellectual Property Disputes in the
Pharmaceutical and Medical Device industries: Antitrust Rules, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv.
359, 383 (2002) ("Prior to the passage of the Hatch- Waxman Act, manufacturers of generic
drugs were required to file a new NDA and duplicate the safety and efficacy studies already
conducted by the original applicant."); Patcharin Pisut, Freedom to Research: Room for
Trial and Error in Drug Development After Merck KGaA V. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'y 339, 342 ("As with newly patented drugs, a competitor's
generic copy of a name-brand drug is subject to FDA regulatory review before it is
approved for sale in the United States. ").
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use was considered to be actionable infringement?7 Thus, the
manufacturer of the generic drug was essentially forced to wait- or
risk costly litigation - until the patent on the generic drug expired
before even beginning to formulate its own equivalent, and then
continue to wait while the FDA acted on the application to approve
the generic. 28 This, of course, provided the patentee with a de facto
extension of the patent's life by allowing the patentee to remain the
exclusive provider of the drug for the period between the expiration of
the patent and the submission and approval of the generic's
29
application. As a result, generic competition usually did not begin
until three to five years after the expiration of the underlying patent. 30
The Hatch-Waxman Act solved this problem by amending both
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Patent Act. With respect to
the former, Congress created a new process called the Abbreviated
New Drug Application ("ANDA") whereby a manufacturer of a
generic drug can certifY that the drug it seeks to market is
3l
bioequivalent to a drug that has already been approved by the FDA.
This process obviates the need for the manufacturer of the generic
drugs to run duplicative tests to show, for the second time, that its
drug is safe and efficacious?2 With respect to the Patent Act, HatchWaxman essentially overruled the Federal Circuit's decision in Roche
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. 33 In Roche, the court held
that using the patented product to conduct bioequivalency
experiments constituted infringement and could, consistent with
27. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
28. See Sarah E. Eurek, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of
Generic Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 0018, '\12,
http://www.law.duke.edu~journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2003DLTROO18.pdf ("[U]ntil the early
1980s, manufacturers wishing to develop generic counterparts to patented drugs had no
choice but to wait for the original patents to expire before they could begin the application
process to obtain FDA approval, which significantly delayed the market entry of generic
drugs.").
29. See Joyce Wing Yan Tam, Note, Biologics Revolution: The Intersection of
Biotechnology, Patent Law. and Pharmaceutical Regulation, 98 GEO. LJ. 535, 540 (2010)
(,,[Pharmaceutical research firms] argued that forcing generic drug makers to wait until after
patent expiration to commence the lengthy FDA approval process, in effect, created a de
facto term extension that further inhibited the public's access to affordable medicine.").
30. Janet A. Gongola, Prescriptions for Change: The Hatch-Waxman Act and New
Legislation to Increase the Availability of Generic Drugs to Consumers, 36 IND. L. REv.
787,816 (2003).
31. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2011).
32. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2001). As
the Mylan court explained:
An ANDA offers an expedited approval process for generic drug
manufacturers. Instead of filing a full NDA with new safety and
efficacy studies, in an ANDA a generic manufacturer may rely in part
on the pioneer manufacturer's work by submitting data demonstrating
the generic product's bioequivalence with the previously approved
drug.
Id.
33. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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general rules of equity, be enjoined. 34 The Hatch-Waxman Act
abolished that rule. 35 Under Section 271 of the Patent Act, it is no
longer "an act of infringement to make, use ... or sell ... a patented
invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.,,36 Thus, any experimentation
with a patented drug that is undertaken for the purposes of submitting
an ANDA is no longer considered infringement?7 These two sections
in combination were meant to spur the process of bringing lower cost
. drugs to mark et.'38
genenc
To counter-balance the benefit conferred on the generics, and to
continue to promote the development of pioneer drugs, Congress
enacted rules, as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act, that were meant to
benefit brand-name manufacturers. Specifically, the Act provided for
the extension of the life of the patent to account for the delays
associated with the FDA approval process?9 Thus, the Act sought to
eliminate the unwarranted de facto extension of the patent term
stemming from the inability of the generic to enter the market, but
cushioned that blow by allowing the patentees to collect profits on
their labors for as long as they would have been able to absent the
FDA approval process. 40
The Act also encouraged generic manufacturers to litigate the
validity, enforceability, and infringement of the patents covering
41
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides that any
brand-name drugS.
generic manufacturer that successfully challenges any of those issues
in litigation will enjoy a 180-day period of exclusivity.42 In other
words, the FDA will not approve any other generic drug to compete
with the brand name or the first-to- file generic until 180 days from the

34. See id. at 865-67.
35.35 U.S.CA § 271(e)(1) (West 2011).
36.id.
37. See id.
38. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
39.35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006). This provision is what gave the Act the second half of its
title, as this portion ofthe Act "restored" the time lost to the FDA approval process.
40. See Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1260-61 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (discussing the distortions and their elimination by the Hatch-Waxman Act).
41. See Steven W. Day, Note, Leaving Room for innovation: Rejecting the FTC's Stance
Against Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 223, 228
(2006) ("Through the Act, Congress sought to lower prices of prescription drugs by
encouraging generic drug manufacturers to challenge patented brand-name drugs and enter
the market."); Sarah Sorscher, Note, A Longer Monopoly for Biologics?: Considering the
implications of Data Exclusivity As a Tool for innovation Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
285, 296 (2009) ("The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages such challenges by rewarding the
first generic firm to submit an ANDA challenging the patent."); see also H.R. REp. No. 98857, at 71 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 2647,2681 (minority views of Mr.
Bliley).
42. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (West 2011).
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first generic's market entry.43 For the generics companies that
successfully challenge existing patents, this provision IS very
lucrative,44 often worth hundreds of millions of dollars. 45
B. The Mechanics of the Hatch-Waxman Act

In order to understand how reverse settlements came about, it is
first necessary to understand the mechanics of litigation under the
Hatch-Waxman Act. To that end, this Part provides an overview of a
typical litigation between manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals
and brand-name pharmaceuticals.
When the FDA approves any new brand-name drug for
marketing, the manufacturer is required to submit to the FDA the
patent number and expiration date of every patent that covers the
brand-name drug being submitted for approval. 46 If the FDA approves
the drug, each patent is then listed in Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the
"Orange Book.,,47 Whenever a generic manufacturer seeks approval
for a drug via the ANDA process, it must certifY that one of four
conditions is met:
no patent related to the pioneer drug has been
filed;
(II) the relevant patent has expired;
(III) the patent will expire on a certain date; or
(I)

43. See id.; see also Christopher S. Ponder, Comment, The Dubious Value of HatchWaxman Exclusivity, 45 Hous. L. REv. 555, 560-61 (2008) ("The Act shields the 'first
applicant' of an ANDA who makes a paragraph IV certification against competition from
other ANDA applicants by delaying the FDA's approval of competing applications until
180 days after the first applicant begins to commercially market the drug." (footnote
omitted)).
44. See Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to Achieve
the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust issues in
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 450 (2008)
("During the 180-day market exclusivity period, the first ANDA applicant enjoys a market
duopoly along with the NDA holder; therefore, the market exclusivity is a 'highly lucrative'
reward for the generic drug company.").
45. See Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J. H. Graham, Balancing innovation and Access:
Patent Challenges Tip the Scales, 326 SCIENCE 370,370 (2009) (noting that the 180 days of
exclusivity is worth, on average, $60 million per drug); see also Andrew A. Caffrey, III &
Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and Procedure: Generic Drug Market
Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1,8 n.26 (2004).
46.21 U.S.CA. § 355(b)(1)(West 2011); see also Gongola, supra note 30, at 794.
47. See Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 2007 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 631,638.
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(IV) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic
drug entity.48
If the manufacturer makes the certification under Paragraphs (1)-(111),
no issue of patent law arises, as either there is no valid unexpired
patent in existence, or there is a patent, but the manufacturer of the
generic is asking that approval begin upon the expiration of that
patent. If, however, the manufacturer of the generic substitute
provides what is referred to as "Paragraph IV certification," it sets in
motion a series of events that usually lead to litigation of the
49
.
un der1ymg patent.
Once the Paragraph IV certification is filed, the ANDA applicant
must notifY the holder of the patent rights of his application and
certification under Paragraph IV.50 The patentee then has forty-five
days in which to respond. 51 If the patentee chooses not to respond to
the notification, the FDA can proceed to the approval of the ANDA
application. 52 In that situation, again, no issue of patent law arises
because the patentee chooses not to contest the generic manufacturer's
assertion that the relevant patents are invalid, not infringed, or both. In
the more likely scenario, however, the patentee files suit within fortyfive days of the receipt of the generic's notification. 53 The HatchWaxman Act makes the filing of the ANDA a constructive act of
infringement,54 thus permitting the patent holder to sue for an
55
injunction against the approval and marketing of the generic drug.
48. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
49. John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Fault Lines at the Intersection oj
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule oj Reason, 11 J. TECH.
L. & POL' y 1, 10 (2006) ('"The filing of a patent infringement action by the brand name
manufacturer is virtually guaranteed.").
50.21 U.S.CA. § 355(j)(2)(B).
51.Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
52.Id. However, the filing of a suit by the patentee is "virtually guaranteed." See Fazzio,
supra note 49, at 10.
53. See Fazzio, supra note 49, at 10.
54.35 U.S.CA § 271(e)(2) (West 2011).
55. See id. § 271(e)(4) (discussing the injunctive remedy available). Recall that prior to
the Hatch-Waxman Act, a patentee could sue as soon as the generic manufacturer began
experimenting in order to produce a competitive product. See supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text. With the passage of the Act, this avenue for litigation was closed. See
35 U.S.CA. § 271(e)(I). However, Congress chose not to require the patentee to wait until
the generic actually entered the market. Instead, it permitted a patentee to file suit prior to
the approval of the generic's ANDA. The reason for this is rather straightforward. Multiple
studies have shown that once the generic enters the market, the value of the patent drops
considerably and can never be recovered to pre-generic entry levels, even if the generic is
ultimately withdrawn. See Saami Zain, Sword or Shield? An Overview and Competitive
Analysis oJthe Marketing oJ "Authorized Generics," 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 739,746 (2007)
(stating that "generic entry often causes branded companies to quickly lose between 50 and
80 percent of their pre-generic sales"); see also NARINDER S. BANAIT, FENWICK & WEST
LLP, AUTHORIZED GENERICS: ANTITRUST ISSUES AND THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 1

292

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 24

Should the patent holder choose to exercise his right to sue the
ANDA filer, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for an automated stay
of the ANDA process,56 The stay remains in effect for thirty months
or until the resolution of the lawsuit, whichever comes first. 57 As a
result of the 2003 amendments to the Hatch-Waxman framework,58
only a single thirty-month stay is available,59 Once litigation is
concluded in favor of the ANDA filer or once the ANDA application
has been effectively approved as a result of the expiration of the
thirty-month stay (whichever is later), the ANDA filer has seventyfive days to begin to market its product or it must forfeit its I80-day
exclusivity period,6o The exclusivity period is available to any first
(2005),
available
at
http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/IP/Authorized_
Generics.pdf (stating that authorized generics allow "branded companies to maintain cash
flow, albeit at a lowered rate, once generic competition starts").
56.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (West 2011).
57.1d. The stay does not affect the FDA's evaluation of the application. However, no
approval can be granted until either the expiration of the patent or the resolution of the
litigation in favor of the generic manufacturer. Fazzio, supra note 49, at 10-11 (citing 21
U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)). The stay can be extended (or shortened) by a court as a
penalty against a party that "failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action." 21
U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
5S. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act ("MMA") of
2003, Pub. L. No. lOS-173, §§ 1101-02, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003), amended the HatchWaxman Act to, inter alia, limit thirty-month stays, and to adjust the requirements for the
exercise ofthe ISO-day exclusivity period.
59.21 U.S.CA § 355(c)(3)(C). Previously, an NDA holder could amend its Orange
Book entries to list new patents. Such an amendment would require new Paragraph IV
certifications, which would in turn trigger a new thirty-month stay. See FED. TRADE
COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 43-44
(2002) [hereinafter FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY]. available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf The MMA eliminated this possibility by limiting the
NDA holder to a single thirty-month stay. See Natalie Pous, Shifting the Balance Between
Branded and Generic Pharmaceutical Companies: Amendments to Hatch-Waxman Past.
Present. and Future, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 301, 309-10 (2009). On average, the thirty-month
period is enough time to complete litigation, as the average length of a Hatch-Waxman
patent case is twenty-nine months. S. Peter Ludwig et aI., Hatch-Waxman in the Federal
Courts: From 1994-2004, 31 DRUG DEY. & INDUS. PHARMACY 215, 221 (2005). This time
does not include appellate review, which takes, on average, another year.ld. The expiration
of the thirty-month automatic stay does not necessarily enable the generic manufacturer to
launch the drug, as the NDA holder may seek a preliminary injunction against the ANDA
filer. 35 U.S.CA § 271(e)(4)(B) (stating that "injunctive relief may be granted against an
infringer to prevent the commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United
States or importation into the United States of an approved drug or veterinary biological
product"). Furthermore, studies show that generic companies are reluctant to enter the
market absent a final decision in their favor, as that opens them up to financial liability. See
FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra, at 22.
60. Liu, supra note 44, at 453. Liu further explains:
Under the new provisions, the ISO-day exclusivity period is forfeited
if the first ANDA filer fails to market the generic version by the later
of: (1) seventy-five days after the effective approval of its application,
or thirty months after it was submitted, whichever is earlier; or (2)
seventy-five days after the date on which a court decision has held
that the NDA holder's patent is invalid or is not being infringed upon,
a settlement has been approved by the court, or the NDA holder has
withdrawn its patent information.
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filer, regardless of success on the merits of a Paragraph IV claim. 61 It
is this provision that permits ANDA filers to settle suits with
patentees while simultaneously keeping the benefits of the exclusivity
period. In this way, the costs of patent litigation (which average $5
million)62 are avoided, while the benefits are enjoyed.

III.

REVERSE SETTLEMENTS

As with any litigation, settlement of patent suits is not unusual.
Indeed, about 80% of such suits are settled. 63 The rate of settlement in
the specific context of pharmaceutical patent litigation under the
Hatch-Waxman Act is actually lower 38%.64 Most of these
settlements do not present any unusual problems. However, about
45% of settlements (or 17% of cases) result in payments flowing not
from the accused infringer to the patentee, but from the patentee to the
6s
infringer. Such an arrangement would not be particularly unusual if
the payments were accompanied by the patentee's agreement not to
assert the patent in the future. In that situation, the patentee would
essentially be reimbursing the challenger for the cost of litigation and
then permitting the challenger to enter the market. The reverse
settlements are unusual in that the patentee pays the challenger while
simultaneously preserving its patent monopoly. Furthermore, unlike
usual patent litigation where the dispute touches on products that are
already on or about to enter the market, Hatch-Waxman litigation
occurs prior to the generic drug actually entering the market.
id.
61. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding
that success on the merits is not required to obtain 180 days of exclusivity by the first
Paragraph IV filer). The system in place between 1998 and 2003 allowed an ANDA filer to
certify its application under Paragraph IV, and then withdraw such certification and change
it to Paragraph Ill, all without losing its period of exclusivity. Compare id. (requiring only
the filing of Paragraph IV certification for 180-day exclusivity period) with MMA § 1102
(codified in 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(Ill)) (imposing forfeiture of 180-day exclusivity
period upon withdrawal of certification, as of 2003). The MMA changed that and now
requires forfeiture of exclusivity if the Paragraph IV certification is wi1hdrawn. See Liu,
supra note 44, at 453. This change in law, however, was not sufficient to preclude all
reverse settlements. See infra Part IV.A.
62. See Higgins & Graham, supra note 45, at 370 (contextualizing the costs of
challenging a patent in relation to the larger "potential payoff' of $60 million in the first 180
days).
63. Matthew B. Zisk, Mediation and Settlement of Patent Disputes in the Shadow of the
Public interest, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 481, 489 (1999). Although this figure is an
estimate only, and is "based on anecdotal evidence or on only a few studies," it is largely in
line with the settlement rate of other civil suits, which is about 85-90%.id.
64. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 59, at 16.
65.id. at 17 (stating that nine out of twenty settled cases, or 45%, involved payments
from the patentee to the generic). This number may be an underestimate as noted by the
Second Circuit in Ciprojloxacin 11, 604 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (notiug that "1here is
evidence that the practice of entering into reverse exclusionary payment settlements has
increased").
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Consequently, in the Hatch-Waxman litigation there are no damages
(other than the cost oflitigation for each party) to be had. Yet under a
reverse settlement the patentee often pays amounts far exceeding the
cost of litigation to the challengers.
While each settlement obviously has different terms, the general
parameters are quite similar across all settlements. This Part outlines
several settlements that have been subject to judicial challenges. The
goal of this Part is not so much to describe every settlement in great
detail, but to show the common features of reverse settlements.
A. Cardizem

One of the first reverse settlements - or at least one of the first
that attracted significant public scrutiny - involved Cardizem CD, a
brand-name prescription calcium channel blocker used to treat several
66
heart ailments such as hypertension and angina. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc. held a patent directed towards the dissolution profile of
Cardizem CD. 67 Andrx Pharmaceuticals - a generic manufacturerfiled an ANDA seeking to manufacture a generic equivalent of
Cardizem CD and certified, under Paragraph IV, that none of the
patents covering Cardizem CD would be infringed by its product. 68
About a year after Andrx filed its initial application, the FDA issued
preliminary approval and stated that final approval would issue once
69
the thirty-month stay expired or the court ruled in favor of Andrx.
Almost immediately after the FDA issued the preliminary
approval, Hoechst and Andrx entered into a settlement agreement. 70
The agreement provided that Hoechst (the patentee) would pay Andrx
$40 million per year until Andrx received a final favorable court
ruling. 71 In exchange, Andrx agreed not to enter the market with its
generic version of the drug until there was such a final unappealable
ruling in its favor, even if the thirty-month stay expired prior to such a
ruling. 72 In other words, Andrx agreed to remain off the market even
after receiving a final approval from the FDA (which would issue
upon the expiration of the thirty-month period). Andrx also agreed not
to waive its ISO-day exclusivity period. 73
Several pharmaceutical companies challenged the settlement as a
violation of the antitrust laws and argued that, but for the agreement
66. See La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (in re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896,901-02 (6th Cir. 2003).
67.id. at 902. Hoechst also held a patent directed to the active ingredient in Cardizem
(diltiazem hydrochloride); however, that patent expired in 1992.id. at 90 I.
68.id. at 902.
69.id.
70.id.
71. id. at 902 n.3.
72. id. at 902.
73.id.
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between Hoechst and Andrx, the generic version would have come on
the market earlier, and that the agreement "protected [Hoechst] from
competition from both Andrx and other potential generic competitors
because Andrx's delayed market entry postponed the start of its 180day exclusivity period.,,74
The Sixth Circuit addressed the question of whether such an
.
. latlOn.
' 75 l
Id
agreement was a per se antitrust
VI0
t conc
u e d th
at 'It was. 76
In the court's view, the agreement "was, at its core, a horizontal
agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD
throughout the entire United States,,,77 because it "guaranteed to
[Hoechst] that its only potential competitor at that time, Andrx,
would ... refrain from marketing its generic version of Cardizem CD
even after it had obtained FDA approval, protecting [Hoecht]'s
exclusive access to the market" while simultaneously "delay[ing] the
entry of other generic competitors, who could not enter until the
expiration of Andrx's 180-day period of marketing exclusivity.,,78
Because the court concluded that this was a classic horizontal
agreement to restrain trade, it applied a per se rule and refused to
consider any pro-competitive arguments advanced by Andrx and
79
Hoechst.
The same Cardizem settlement described above was also subject
to litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. 8o The D.C. Circuit found that a "payment flowing from the
innovator to the challenging generic firm may suggest strongly the
anticompetitive intent of the parties in entering the agreement and the
rent-preserving effect of that agreement.,,81 In the court's view,
although Andrx was entitled to bar other generic manufacturers from
entering the market under the 180-day exclusivity provision, "Andrx' s
manipulation of the exclusivity period trigger date extended" its legal
rights beyond those authorized by the Hatch-Waxman Act, and was
82
therefore in violation of the antitrust laws. The court concluded that
83
the agreement was a per se violation of the Sherman ACt.

74.id. at 904.
75.id. at 905-06.
76.id. at 908.
77.id.
78.id. at 907.
79.id. at 906-08.
80. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp.lnt'!, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
81.id. at 809 (quoting David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust
Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.1. 321, 335 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Andrx, 256 F.3d at 810.
83. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 915 (affirming the grant of"summary judgment [because] the
defendants had committed a per se violation ofthe antitrust laws").
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B. Hytrin

At about the same time as the Cardizem settlement litigation in
the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit was considering Valley Drug
84
Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. This case involved settlement
agreements between several generic companies and Abbott
Laboratories, which held a patent on Hytrin, a drug used to treat
85
hypertension and prostate hyperplasia.
Following the filing of an ANDA with a Paragraph IV
certification by two generic companies, Abbott filed suits, eventually
86
settling both cases. Both agreements required Abbott to pay several
million dollars in exchange for the generics forbearing from market
entry until a specified date, until some other generics firm
successfully brought a generic equivalent of Hytrin to market, or until
87
a final unappealable ruling holding the patents in question invalid.
Each settlement thus postponed the date of entry beyond the 30-month
stay, but did not end the litigation between the generics and Abbott.
Additionally, the generics agreed not to waive their ISO-day
.. peno
. d.88
exc 1USIVlty
Ultimately, Abbott lost the suit when the Federal Circuit affirmed
the judgment of invalidity during an interlocutory appeal. 89 This
outcome would have resulted in termination of the agreements but for
the fact that they were terminated earlier in response to an
9o
investigation by the FTC.
Following these events, a group of plaintiffs filed an antitrust
action against Abbott, Geneva, and Zenith alleging that the
agreements were a per se illegal restraint of trade in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman ACt. 91 The Eleventh Circuit, in rejecting the
per se approach, stated that "[i]f this case merely involved one firm
making monthly payments to potential competitors in return for their
exiting or refraining from entering the market, we would readily
affirm the district court's order. This is not such a case, however,
because one of the parties owned a patent."n The court reasoned that
because patents carry with them the right to exclude, any agreements
84.344 F.3d 1294 (lith Cir. 2003).
85. See id. at 1298. Abbott's patent was directed to crystalline forms of terazosin
hydrochloride, which is the active ingredient in Hytrin. As was the case with Cardizem,
there also existed a patent on the terazosin hydrochloride itself, but it had expired by the
time the first ANDAs were filed.ld.
86. Id. at 1300-0 l. In both cases the generic companies conceded infringement and
argued only that the patent was invalid.ld.
87.1d.
88.1d. at 1300.
89. Id. at 130 l.
90.1d.
9l. Id.
92.1d. at 1304.
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that protect that right cannot be per se illegal, but must be analyzed in
light of the patentee's right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the patented product. 93 The court also observed that "[g]iven
the asymmetries of risk and large profits at stake, even a patentee
confident in the validity of its patent might pay a potential infringer a
substantial sum in settlement.,,94 After additional years of litigation
95
the case ultimately settled.
C. Tamoxifen

In 2006, it was the Second Circuit's tum to review an alleged
antitrust violation following a settlement between Zeneca, Inc. - a
manufacturer of tamoxifen,96 a drug used in the treatment of breast
cancer - and Barr Laboratories, a generic manufacturer that sought
.versIOn
. 0 f th'IS drug. 97
to pro duce a genenc
In response to Barr's Paragraph IV filing, Zeneca sued, but lost in
the district court because the patent was ruled invalid, the
98
consequence of intentional withholding of clinical test results. While
the appeal was pending in the Federal Circuit, Zeneca and Barr
99
entered into a settlement agreement. In return for payment and a
non-exclusive license to manufacture tamoxifen, Barr agreed to
withdraw its Paragraph IV certification and refile its ANDA with a
Paragraph III certification, attesting that it would not market its own
version of tamoxifen until Zeneca's patent expired. lOO Additionally,
the parties agreed that should another lawsuit challenging Zeneca's
tamoxifen patents be filed and result in an unappealable judgment that
its patents are either invalid or not enforceable, Barr could default to
101
its Paragraph IV certification. In other words, if a third party were
to prevail in its challenge to Zeneca's patents, Barr would be in the
same position as it would have been had it prevailed in its own
case. 102 Pursuant to the settlement, the district court's judgment of
~
b'l'
unenLorcea
1 Ity was vacate d . 103.
93.1d. at 1311.
94.1d. at 1310.
95. United Wis. Servs., Inc., v. Abbott Labs. (in re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litig.), No. 99MDL1317SElTZKLEIN, 2005 WL 2451960, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2005)
(approving the settlement).
96. Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (in re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187,
193 (2d Cir. 2006). Zeneca marketed its version of tamoxifen under the brand name
Nolvadex.ld.
97.1d. at 190.
98.1d. at 193.
99.1d.
100. Id. at 193-94.
101.1d. at 194. This would, of course, permit Barr to reclaim its first filer status and with
it the 180-day exclusivity period.
102.1d. Recall that Zeneca and Barr settled while Zeneca's appeal of the unfavorable
district court judgment was pending in the Federal Circuit. This case was settled before the
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Subsequently, three other companies filed ANDAs with
Paragraph IV certifications to produce a generic version of
tamoxifen. l04 However, because of Barr's first filer status, no other
manufacturer was able to enter the tamoxifen market until Barr
' . peno
. d . 105
. exc I
ex h auste d Its
USIVlty
While the various claims on Zeneca's patent validity continued to
be litigated, consumers filed an antitrust challenge to the Barr-Zeneca
1993 agreement. 106 The plaintiffs alleged that the settlement
agreement violated the antitrust laws because it enabled Zeneca's
continuing monopolization of the market for tamoxifen by
resurrecting a patent already adjudged to be invalid, thus stifling
l07
competition from other generic manufacturers. Unlike the plaintiffs
in Valley Drug and Cardizem litigation, though, the plaintiffs here did
not push the theory that the settlements were per se illegal. Rather,
they argued that the payments offered by Zeneca to Barr were
"excessive" and therefore anti-competitive. 108
The Second Circuit disagreed. The court conceded that "even if
reverse payments are a natural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman
process, it does not follow that they are necessarily lawful.,,109
Nevertheless, the court "doubt[ ed] the wisdom of deeming a patent
effectively invalid on the basis of a patent holder's fear of losing
it.,,110 Thus, according to the court, the patent remained valid and gave
the authority to the patent holder to exclude others from the market.
Consequently, unless a court finds that "the exclusionary effects of the
agreement exceed the scope of the patent's protection" the agreement
must be found to be within the patentee's rights and therefore not a
violation of the antitrust laws. 111 In short, because Zeneca's patent
was not finally adjudged to have been invalid or unenforceable, in the
Second Circuit's view, Zeneca had a right to continue its monopoly.
Judge Pooler dissented, arguing for a less deferential totality-ofthe-circumstances standard,ll2 rather than the majority's standard of
"absent an extension of the monopoly beyond the patent's scope ...
Supreme Court decided u.s. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S.
18 (1994), which held that appellate courts should not vacate judgments below in the face of
a settlement. Consequently, Zeneca was able to convince the Federal Circuit to vacate the
unfavorable district court judgment and avoid the preclusive effect of the unenforceability
finding.
103. Imperial Chern. Indus., PLC v. Heumann Pharma GmbH & Co., 991 F.2d 811 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision).
104. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 194-95.
105.1d. at 195.
106. Id. at 196.
107.1d. at 196-97.
108.1d. at 208.
109.1d. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
llO.1d. at 210.
111.1d. at 212-13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
l12.1d. at 228 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
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and absent fraud.,,113 While Judge Pooler was not prepared to declare
such settlements illegal per se - a theory that was not advanced by
the plaintiffs - she argued that the case ought to be remanded to the
district court for further fact-finding in light of the standard she
proposed.11 4
D. Ciprofloxacin I

The Federal Circuit, which has near-exclusive jurisdiction over
the patent laws, also addressed the legality of reverse settlements in
the context of Hatch-Waxman litigation. The case involved a
settlement between Bayer, a German pharmaceutical manufacturer
that held a patent on the active ingredient in ciprofloxacin, and Barr
Laboratories. ll5 Bayer filed suit in response to Barr's filing of ANDA
with a certification that Bayer's patent was both invalid due to
obviousness and unenforceable due to the patentee's inequitable
116
conduct before the Patent Office.
In a pre-trial settlement, Barr dropped its challenge and agreed to
convert its Paragraph IV certification to a Paragraph III certification,
in exchange for payments from Bayer totaling $398.1 million,
ll7
including a $49.1 million initial payout.
Following the settlement,
Barr and Bayer entered into a consent judgment where Barr admitted
infringement and the patent's validity and enforceability.118

113.1d. at 213 (majority opinion).
114.1d. at 232 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
115. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (in re Ciprofioxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.) (Ciprojloxacin 1), 544 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Ciprofioxacin is an antibiotic used to treat a variety of bacterial infections. The antibiotic
was in the news in 2002 when several anthrax-laden letters were sent out to a number of
U.S. officials. Ciprofioxacin, which Bayer markets under the trade name Cipro, is the only
drug that can treat anthrax infection. See Jennifer A. Lazo, Note, The Life-Saving Medicines
Export Act: Why the Proposed u.s. Compulsory Licensing Scheme Will Fail To Export Any
Medicines or Save Any Lives, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 237, 248-49 (2007) (noting that Cipro
is "the only anthrax antibiotic [approved by 1 the U.S. Food and Drug Administration").
Needless to say, the patent on this drug is quite valuable. See Robert H. Trudell, Food
Security Emergencies and the Power of Eminent Domain: A Domestic Legal Tool to Treat a
Global Problem, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 277, 317 (2005) ("Bayer is reported to
earn $1 billion per year on Cipro. ").
116. See Ciprojloxacin 1, 544 F.3d at 1328.
117.1d. at 1328-29 & n.5. Under a separate supply agreement, Bayer could supply Barr
with Bayer-made ciprofioxacin or make quarterly payments to Barr. 1d. at 1329. Bayer also
entered into agreements covering Hoechst, Rugby, and Apotex, another generic drug
manufacturer that is controlled by Barr's principal shareholder. See id. at 1327-28.
118.1d. at 1329. In 1997, Bayer filed for patent reexamination with the Patent Office,
during which some of the original claims were cancelled and some were amended, and
mutatis mutandis, the patent was reaffirmed. Following the reissue, four more generic
companies filed Paragraph IV certification on the reissued patent. Bayer sued each of the
companies and prevailed in three of the suits, while the fourth one was dismissed when the
company withdrew the Paragraph IV certification. See id.

300

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 24

In 2000 and 200 I, several plaintiffs filed suit against Bayer
alleging, inter alia, that Bayer's settlement violated the antitrust laws
under the Walker Process l19 doctrine and that "Bayer unlawfully
monopolized the ciprofloxacin market in violation of state antitrust
laws by enforcing a patent obtained by fraud. Specifically, they
alleged that Bayer violated state antitrust and/or consumer protection
laws through fraud on the PTO and sham litigation in enforcing
the ... patent against Barr.,,120 The plaintiffs also alleged that the
settlement "constituted an illegal market allocation in violation of the
prohibition on contracts in restraint of trade contained in sections I
and 2 of the Sherman Act and in violation of various state antitrust
and consumer protection laws.,,121
In rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments, the Federal Circuit held that
"[ s ]ettlement of patent claims by agreement between the partiesincluding exchange of consideration - rather than by litigation is not
precluded by the Sherman Act even though it may have some adverse
effects on competition.,,122 The court noted that "a sizable exclusion
payment from the patent holder to the generic manufacturer is not
unexpected under the Hatch-Waxman Act, where the relative risks of
litigation are redistributed.,,123 The court stated that the "essence of
the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the
exclusionary zone of the patent," and concluded that "in the absence
of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation, the court need
not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a
settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.,,124 Importantly,
the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that one must "evaluate the
strength of the patent in determining whether reverse payments are
unlawful.,,125 Accordingly, the court rejected the notion that in
evaluating reverse settlements, an "analysis of patent validity is
appropriate in the absence of fraud or sham litigation.,,126

119. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chern. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 17778 (1965) (holding that enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may
be a violation of the Sherman Act).
120. Ciprojloxacin 1,544 F.3d at 1330.
121.1d. at 1329.
122.1d. at 1333.
123.1d. at 1333 n.l1.
124.1d. at 1336.
125. See id. at 1334-35.
126.1d. at 1337.
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E. Ciprofloxacin II

In the part of the ciprofloxacin case that remained with the
Second Circuit,127 the panel ruled that it was constrained by the prior
panel's ruling in Tamoxifen, and therefore declined to adopt a per se
rule against the reverse settlements. 128 The panel, however, went to
129
great lengths to disparage the reasoning of Tamoxifen. At the end of
its opinion, the panel stated that it "believe[ s] there are compelling
reasons to revisit Tamoxifen with the benefit of the full Court's
consideration of the difficult questions at issue and the important
interests at stake. [The panel] therefore invite [s] the plaintiffsappellants to petition for rehearing in banc.,,130 Despite the panel's
invitation, the Second Circuit declined to reconsider its
l3l
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, at least three judges on that court are
now on record - through their opinion in this case - expressing
their views that reverse settlements are likely illegal as a matter of
antitrust law.
F. Schering-Plough

The government directly challenged a reverse settlement between
a brand-name manufacturer and a generic in one case: Schering132
It is
Plough Corp. v. FTC, heard by the Eleventh Circuit in 2005.
the reasoning of this case that was adopted by the Federal Circuit and
the Second Circuit, in the Ciprofloxacin I and Tamoxifen cases,
respectively.133 Because of the government's involvement, this case
also figures prominently in the debates over the propriety of reverse
settlements. 134
The dispute in Schering-Plough concerned a coating for
135
potassium chloride. The pill was marketed under the brand name K127. See Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (Ciprojloxacin I/), 604
F.3d 98, 103 n.lO (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that only Walker Process claims were transferred
to the Federal Circuit, as the resolution of those claims depended on issues of patent law).
128. See id. at 106.
129. See id. at 108-10.
130.Id. at 110.
13!. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010)
(denying petition to rehear the case en banc). This decision, however, should not be
necessarily taken as an indication that the rest of the Second Circuit agrees with the panel's
decision. The Second Circuit is notorious for declining to sit en banc even in the most
extraordinary cases. See, e.g., Ricci v. Destefano, 530 F.3d 88, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2008)
(Katzmann, 1., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
132.402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
133. See Ciprojloxacin 1,544 F.3d 1323, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 10blove v. Barr Labs.
Inc. (in re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187,202 (2d Cir. 2006).
134. A quick Lexis search conducted on March 26, 2011 revealed that this case was cited
in 105 law review articles, 37 treatises, and 35 judicial decisions.
135. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1058. The active ingredient itself; potassium chloride,
is a common salt and obviously unpatentable. Id. Schering, however, held a patent (with an
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Dur and was used as a supplement for treatment of high blood
136
pressure and/or congestive heart failure.
Two generics filed an
ANDA certifying that Schering's patent on the coating was invalid
and unenforceable,137 and Schering sued for infringement. 138 Prior to
trial, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, in which
Schering agreed to multi-million dollar payments to generics in
exchange for the generics' agreement to split the patent term with
Schering and license to Schering some of their own intellectual
property.139 As expected, the generics agreed not to waive or transfer
140
the ISO-day exclusivity period.
The FTC filed a complaint against all of the parties, alleging that
the agreements were "illegal agreements in restraint of trade, in
violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.c. § 45, and in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.c. § 1.,,141 The full Commission did not hold that the settlements
were illegal per se; rather, it concluded that Schering paid the
challengers in order to delay the entry of the generic products onto the
market,142 and that such delay injures competition and consumers:
[T]he Commission prohibited settlements under
which the generic receives anything of value and
agrees to defer its own research, development,
production or sales activities. Nevertheless, the
Commission carved out one arbitrary exception for
payments to the generic: beyond a "simple
compromise" to the entry date, if payments can be
linked to litigation costs (not to exceed $2 million),
and the Commission is notified of the settlement,
then the parties need not worry about a later antitrust
attack. 143
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the FTC's finding, holding that
"the Commission manufactured a rule that would make almost any
expiration date in 2006) on the pill's coating that allowed for extended release of the active
ingredient. Id.
136.1d.
137.1d. at 1059 n.2, 1060 n.5.
138. See id. at 1058-60.
139.1d. at 1083.
140. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1084 (2003) nT]he settlement
agreement between Schering and Upsher-Smith preserved a barrier to generic competition
to K-Dur 20.").
141. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1061. The FTC also claimed that Schering
"monopolized and conspired to monopolize the potassium supplement market." Id.
142. Id. at 1062. The Commission concluded that payments that Schering made in order
to obtain licenses from Upsher and ESI did not represent legitimate consideration for those
licenses.ld.
143.1d.
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settlement involving a payment illegal," directly contrary to the
court's opinion in Valley Drug. 144 The court concluded:
[T]he size of the payment, or the mere presence of a
payment, should not dictate the availability of a
settlement remedy. Due to the asymmetries [sic] of
risk and large profits at stake, even a patentee
confident in the validity of its patent might pay a
potential infringer a substantial sum in settlement.
An exception cannot lie, as the Commission might
think, when the issue turns on validity (Valley Drug)
as opposed to infringement (the Schering
agreements). The effect is the same: a generic's entry
into the market is delayed. What we must focus on is
the extent to which the exclusionary effects of the
agreement fall within the scope of the patent's
. 145
protectIOn.
G. Provigil
As the volume of criticism of bare cash payments from brandname manufacturers to generic challengers has increased, companies
have become more creative in structuring these settlements. Two
recent cases exemplify the new complexities involved in reverse
settlements.
In early 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania considered a reverse settlement agreement between
Cephalon - a holder of a patent on Provigil- and four generic
companies. 146 Although the court's oplllIOn only addressed
Cephalon's motion to dismiss,147 it is instructive of the court's views
on reverse settlements.
Cephalon's patent did not cover the active ingredient in Provigil,
148
but instead was directed to the particle size of the active ingredient.
Four generic manufacturers filed an ANDA for the generic version of
Provigil, and all four certified that the patent was either invalid or
149
would not be infringed.
Ultimately, Cephalon entered into a

144.1d. at 1075.
145.1d. at 1075-76 (footnote & citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa.
2010).
147.1d. at 517.
148. Id. at 521.
149.1d. The MMA allows for multiple "first filers" to share the 180-day exclusivity
period. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(1l)(bb) (West 2011) (defining "first applicant" as
any applicant that submits a "substantially complete" application "on the first day on which
a[nother] substantially complete application" was submitted); John M. Rebman, Dr. Strange
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settlement with each challenger, involving large payments in
exchange for an agreement that the generic would manufacture the
active ingredient in Provigil and sell it back to Cephalon at a fixed
price. 150 The agreements also called for a number of cross-licenses
151
Each of the generics agreed
between Cephalon and each generic.
not to market their own version of Pro vigil until a certain agreed-upon
152
date.
As usual, the generics also agreed not to relinquish the lSOday exclusivity period. 153
The district court, in denying Cephalon's motion to dismiss
various antitrust claims by the FTC and other plaintiffs, concluded
that the settlement may have enlarged the scope of the patent, and
154
therefore that additional proceedings were in order. It thus appears
that, in further adjudications, the district court will be tasked with
evaluating the patent's validity, enforceability, and scope for the
purposes of infringement the very determinations that the
settlements sought to avoid. The appeal will then likely lie with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, rather than the Federal
Circuit. 155 Thus, plaintiffs such as the FTC, who have little
understanding of-or interest in - the intricacies of patent law,156
will be litigating the case, and judges who have little experience in
adjudicating patent disputes will be deciding it. This is far from an
157
ideal outcome.
Thus, the basic parameters of a reverse settlement are these: In
exchange for a payment of significant sums of money from the
patentee to the challenger, the challenger agrees to forbear from
entering the market. The challenger generally agrees to preserve and
not transfer its ISO-day exclusivity period, and the patentee agrees to
split the life of the patent with the challenger. Agreements may be
complicated and payments obscured by the challenger licensing some
of its own intellectual property to the patentee. These licenses make it
drastically harder to figure out whether the payments are being made
simply to induce the generic to delay market entry, or whether they

Drug, or: How 1 Learned To Stop Worrying and Love Authorized Generics, 12 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CAREL. 159,166-67 (2009).
150. King Drug, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 522-23.
l51.1d.
l52.1d. at 522.
l53.1d. at 530.
l54.1d. at 533-36.
155. Cj id. at 534-35 (noting that similar appeals in Valley Drug went from the District
Court to the Eleventh Circuit).
156.1 do not suggest that the attorneys at the FTC (or the commissioners) are somehow
not capable enough to understand patent law. However, patent law is not the FTC's primary
concern - antitrust law is. For this reason, 1 do not expect the FTC to be particularly
alarmed if, in pursuing better antitrust outcomes, it creates worse patent law outcomes.
157. Such an appellate route would run counter to the congressional intent of creating
uniformity in patent law. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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significantly clouds the antitrust analysis.
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turn,

THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, JUDICIAL, AND ACADEMIC
RESPONSE

With the number of reverse settlements between generic and
brand-name manufacturers increasing,158 it is no surprise that the issue
has not escaped the attention of politicians, judges, and academics.
This Part reviews these groups' reactions to the reverse settlements.
A. The Legislative Reaction
The legislative branch has been particularly unhappy with reverse
settlements and the judicial tolerance thereof. While no explicit ban
on reverse settlements has been enacted, a number of such bills have
been proposed.
The first efforts to address reverse settlements began in 2002
when the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Drug Competition Act
of 200 1,159 which required all settlements between generic and brandname manufacturers involving agreements over "the manufacture,
marketing or sale of the brand name drug ... [or] of the generic drug"
or "the ISO-day [exclusivity] period" to be disclosed to both the FTC
160
and the DOl. Ultimately, a version of this bill was incorporated into
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003. 161 The Act, however, conferred no new enforcement
authority on either the FTC or the DOl. Indeed, the only purpose of
the bill seems to have been "to enhance the effectiveness and
efficiency of the enforcement of the antitrust laws,,162 which was to be
accomplished "by providing timely notice.,,163 Given the consistent
judicial rejection of the FTC's attempts to rein in reverse settlements
under the present antitrust law, it is rather hard to see how this Act
would achieve its stated goal of "enhanc[ing] the effectiveness and
efficiency of the enforcement of the antitrust and competition laws"l64
beyond the pre-2003 status quo.
Other proposed remedies go much further. In the 109th, 1 10th,
and III th Congresses, Senator Herb Kohl (together with between four
and nine co-sponsors from both parties) introduced the Preserve

158. See supra note 65.
159. S. 754, 107th Congo (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 20,2002).
160.1d. § 5(a)(2).
161. MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111-18, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
162. S. 754 § 3.

163.1d.
164.1d.
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165
Access to Affordable Generics ACt.
The Act would make it
unlawful for the brand-name manufacturer and the generic ANDA
filer to enter into any agreement where (i) "an ANDA filer receives
anything of value," and (ii) "the ANDA filer agrees not to research,
develop, manufacture, market, or sell the ANDA product for any
period of time.,,166 The 109th and 110th Congress versions of the bill
contained no exceptions to the ban. 167 In the newest version, Senator
Kohl's bill would only make two exemptions. First, any payments, not
to exceed $7,500,000, meant to reimburse the ANDA filer "for
reasonable litigation expenses" would not be covered by the
prohibition. 168 Second, the settlements would be presumptively
unlawful and anti-competitive, but the settling parties would be
permitted to rebut the presumption "if the parties to such agreement
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the procompetitive benefits of the agreement outweigh the anti-competitive
effects of the agreement.,,169 In deciphering whether or not the parties
have carried their burden, the trier of fact would be able to consider:
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)

the length of time remaining until the end of
the life of the relevant patent, compared with
the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA
product;
the value to consumers of the competition
from the ANDA product allowed under the
agreement;
the form and amount of consideration received
by the ANDA filer in the agreement resolving
or settling the patent infringement claim;
the revenue the ANDA filer would have
received by winning the patent litigation;
the reduction in the NDA holder's revenues if
it had lost the patent litigation;
the time period between the date of the
agreement conveying value to the ANDA filer
and the date of the settlement of the patent
infringement claim; and

165. S. 369, lllth Congo (as introduced in Senate, Feb. 3,2009); S. 316, 110th Congo (as
introduced in Senate, Jan. 17, 2007); S. 3582, 109th Congo (as introduced in Senate, June
27,2006).
166. S. 369 § 3; S. 316 § 3; S. 3582 § 2.
167. S. 316 § 3; S. 3582 § 2.
168. S. 369, lllth Congo § 3(d)(2) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 15,
2009).
169.1d. § 3(a)(2).
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any other factor that the fact finder, in its
discretion, deems relevant to its determination
of competitive effects under this subsection. 170

Similar legislation has been introduced in the House of
Representatives. In the 11 Oth Congress, Representatives Bobby Rush
and Henry Waxman introduced two separate, yet nearly identical bills
l7l
each of which would flatly prohibit reverse settlements.
Representative Rush introduced an identical bill in the III th
Congress. 172 These proposals would brook no exception to the flat ban
on reverse settlements. 173 While most of these bills have been
languishing in committees, the House did take up a version identical
to the latest Senate bill, and passed it as part of the Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 20 10. 174 The provision, however, was removed
in the Senate. 175
These legislative efforts, though mostly unsuccessful thus far, are
predicated on several proposed congressional findings, some of which
are debatable. For instance, the Waxman bill states that prohibiting
settlements would ultimately result in "lower prices [and] greater
innovation,,,176 and that as a result "settlements which include a
payment from a brand name manufacturer to a generic manufacturer
to delay entry by generic drugs are anti-competitive and contrary to
the interests of consumers.,,177 That is a debatable proposition, for if
banning the settlements would simply result in longer, more
protracted litigation, prices may well increase. 178 Additionally,
innovation may suffer if companies are unable to protect their
179
The
financial investments by avoiding the vagaries of litigation.

170.Id.
171. H.R. 1902, 110th Congo (as introduced by Rep. Rush, Apr. 17,2007); H.R. 1432,
110th Congo [hereinafter Waxman Bill] (as introduced by Rep. Waxman, Mar. 9, 2007).
Congressman Waxman co-sponsored Congressman Rush's bill. H.R. 1902.
172. H.R. 1706, Illth Congo (as introduced by Rep. Rush, Mar. 25, 2009).
173. See id. § 2.
174. See H.R. 4899, l1lth Congo §§ 4201-07 (2010) (House Amendment to the Senate
Amendment),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo .gov Icgi-bin/getdoc.cgiry
dbname= 111_cong_bills&docid=f:h489geah.txt. pdf
175. Compare Supplement Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, 124 Stat.
2302 (missing Title IV ofthe House bill), with H.R. 4899 §§ 4201-07.
176. Waxman Bill, supra note 171, § 2(a)(5).
177.Id. § 2(a)(11).
178. See Andrew Kopelman, Note, Addressing Questionable Business Method Patents
Prior to Issuance: A Two-Part Proposal, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2391, 2403-04 (2006)
(noting that the costs of the litigation are passed on to the public in the form of increased
prices).
179. See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive lllegality, 108 MICH. L. REv. 37, 62 (2009) (stating that "'the caustic
environment of patent litigation' could reduce innovation by increasing the 'uncertainty
around the drug manufacturer's ability to research, develop, and market the patented
product.'" (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. V. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (lith Cir. 2005»).
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latest Kohl bill - which was adopted almost verbatim by the
House 1SO - also rests on questionable findings. That bill suggests that
"the intent of the 1984 [Hatch-Waxman] Act has been subverted by
certain settlement agreements between brand companies and their
potential generic competitors that make 'reverse payments' which are
payments by the brand company to the generic company,,,ISI and that
such agreements "unduly delayed the marketing of low-cost generic
drugs. "IS2
Of course, it is unclear whether the Hatch-Waxman Act has been
"subverted" by agreements that would permit a generic to enter the
market prior to the patent's expiration without the need to actually
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the invalidity of the NDA
holder's patent. It could be just as plausibly argued that such
settlements advance the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act, especially
when the settlements permit generics to enter the market prior to the
expiration date of a valid patent. Similarly, one cannot say that the
entry of the generics is unduly delayed absent some showing that but
for these settlements, the ANDA filers would have prevailed at trial
and been able to enter the market earlier. None of this is to say that
Representative Waxman and Senator Kohl are necessarily wrong in
their assessment 0 f reverse settlements' impact. What I am suggesting
is that the proposed "findings" are, without additional support,
questionable.
The problem is that Congress continues to see these settlements
as an antitrust issue. Therefore, legislative proposals remain open to
the same line of intellectual attack as the FTC's position. 1S3 The
approach proposed infra in Part V avoids this problem.
Before proceeding further, it should be observed that Congress
was successful in enacting legislation that essentially eliminated some
types of settlements. In 2003, as part of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, Congress passed two
provisions affecting reverse settlements. First, Congress enacted
forfeiture provisions for the 180-day exclusivity period. Under the
new version of the law, the generic manufacturer can no longer retain
180. Compare S. 369, lllth Congo § 3(d)(2) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Oct. 15,2009), with H.R. 1902, 110th Congo (as introduced by Rep. Rush, Apr. 17,2007),
and Waxman Bill, supra note 171.
181. S. 369, lllth Congo § 2(a)(6)(A) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct.
15,2009).
l82.1d. § 2(a)(6)(B) (emphasis added).
183. Of course, courts have rejected the FTC's stance based on the law as it currently
stands. See supra Parts 1l1.B-F. Congress has the advantage of changing the law and forcing
the courts to apply the new rules, even if the courts think that such rules rest on questionable
economic or intellectual analysis. But that is a question of raw power, and does not address
the question of whether such an approach actually best preserves the balance between
favoring litigation settlements and protecting consumers from the collusive effects of such
settlements.
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the exclusivity period if, inter alia, it withdraws the Paragraph IV
certification. 184 Under this new rule, the generics in the Ciprofloxacin
and tamoxifen settlements would have lost their exclusivity periods,
thus making these settlements much less worthwhile than before
185
2003.
Congress also mandated forfeiture of exclusivity whenever the
ANDA filer enters into any agreement with respect to the filing that is
186
ultimately adjudged to be a violation of antitrust laws.
In order to
permit the policing of such agreements, Congress enacted a second
provision - requiring the parties who enter into a reverse settlement
187
to file copies of the agreement with the FTC.
The 2003 Act, however, does not eliminate reverse settlements. 188
Even the forfeiture provisions may be circumvented simply by parties
structuring their settlements differently, such that the generic firm
does not withdraw its Paragraph IV certification. Companies remain
free to enter into settlements that "divide the life" of a patent while
recognizing the patent's validity, enforceability, and infringement. 189
B. The Executive Reaction

If the Congressional response to the problem of reverse
settlements has been halting and cautious, the Executive's response
has been downright schizophrenic. Two agencies charged with
enforcing antitrust laws have come to divergent conclusions about the
legality of reverse settlements. The FTC took a hard line, adopting an
approach that would have made all such settlements illegal per se in
all but name. 190 As described above, the FTC attempted to adopt a
rule that would bar all payments to the generic manufacturers that
were the greater of $2 million or actual litigation expenses. That rule
was rej ected by the 11 th Circuit. 191 The FTC, however, continued to
press its view in the Supreme Court, seeking certiorari in Scheringl92
Plough, and in other courts of appeal.
Despite being rejected III
184.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(Ill) (West 2011).
185. Recall that the generic applicants in the Ciprofioxacin and tamoxifen settlements
agreed to withdraw their Paragraph IV certifications and replace them with Paragraph III
certifications. See supra notes 100, 117 and accompanying text.
186.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).
187. MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
188. Cf Ciprojloxacin 11, 604 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that since 2005 there
have been at least twenty reverse settlements).
189. Such recognition could be embodied in a settlement decree entered by a court. Faced
with such a decree, a generic would not be able to launch its product, but also might not be
required to withdraw the Paragraph IV certification.
190. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1061-62 (lith Cir. 2005)
(describing FTC's position); see also supra note 141 and accompanying text.
191. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065.
192. FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (order denying certiorari).
While the FTC sought certiorari, the DOJ, through the Solicitor General, opposed the
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193
nearly every court, the FTC continues to adhere to this view.
For
instance, Jon Leibowitz, the newly appointed chairman of the
Commission, recently stated that "eliminating these deals is one of the
Federal Trade Commission's highest priorities.,,194 In the same
statement, the Chairman also announced the FTC's support for the
congressional bills described in the preceding subsection. 195
On the other hand, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ until
recently took a very different approach. When the FTC filed its
petition for a writ of certiorari in Schering-Plough, the DOJ opposed
the grant and in its separate brief argued that "the mere presence of a
reverse payment in the Hatch-Waxman context is not sufficient to
establish that the settlement is unlawful. Rather, an appropriate legal
standard should take into account the relative likelihood of success of
the parties' claims, viewed ex ante."I96
Recently, however, the DOJ executed a complete about-face with
respect to its view of reverse settlements' validity. On July 6, 2009,
the Justice Department filed an amicus brief with the Second Circuit
in the Ciprofloxacin II case,197 and for the first time asserted that
reverse settlements "should be treated as presumptively unlawful
under Section 1 of the Sherman ACt.,,198 The new position would
subject these settlements to a rule of reason analysis, and would
permit the defendant to rebut the presumption of illegality upon
showing that the "terms of the settlement did not impose[] an
unreasonable restraint on competition, m view of their
petition. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548
U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f216300/
216358.pdf
193. The FTC pressed its position in an amicus brief to the Federal Circuit Brief of
Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission, Ciprojloxacin 1, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(No. 2008-1097), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/2008/01/080129cipro.pdf The Federal
Circuit rejected the FTC's approach. Ciprojloxacin 1, 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The FTC also filed amicus briefs in the Second Circuit Brief Amicus Curiae of Federal
Trade Commission, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F. 3d 98 (2d
Cir. 20 I 0) (No. 05-2851-cv(L)), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/20 I 0/05/
051202amicuscarpentershealth.pdf; Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission,
Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir.
2006) (No. 03-7641), available at http://www.fic.gov /os/2005/12/051202amicustamoxifen
.pdf The Second Circuit also rejected the FTC's views. Ciprojloxacin 11,604 F.3d 98, 105
(2d Cir. 2010); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d 187,208 (2d Cir. 2006).
194. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address at the Center for American
Progress: "Pay-for-Delay" Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can
Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers' Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care
Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) I (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.fic.gov/
speeches/leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf
195.1d. at 5 (stating that the FTC "strongly supports legislation to eliminate pay-fordelay deals").
196. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 192, at II
197. Ciprojloxacin 11,604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010).
198. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Invitation at 10, Ciprojloxacin
11,604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-2851-cv(L)), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
cases/f24 7700/24 7708.pdf
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contemporaneous evaluations of the likelihood of an invalidity
judgment.,,199 This position is still more generous to the settling
parties than what the FTC would prefer, but it is a stark reversal from
the previous position that essentially endorsed the Eleventh Circuit's
approach in Schering-Plough.
Additionally, it is likely that the DO] position will continue
evolving toward a more restrictive view. President Obama, during his
service as a U.S. Senator, was a co-sponsor of Senator Kohl's bill that
2oo
sought to ban reverse settlements altogether.
Indeed, President
Obama's sponsorship of that bill was cited by Mr. Leibowitz as
evidence that the executive branch is committed to increased and
. actlOn
. agalllst
. reverse sett1ements. 201 G'iven t h at t h e Ob ama
aggressive
Administration generally takes a much stricter view of what
constitutes permissible conduct under antitrust laws than its
predecessor,202 and given the Administration's intense focus on health
care issues, it is quite reasonable to expect that it will amplity its
antitrust-grounded objections to settlements between brand-name and
generic drug manufacturers in the context of Hatch-Waxman
litigation.
C. The Judicial Response

Not much more needs to be said about the judicial response to
reverse settlements beyond what was noted in Part III, supra.
However, as more reverse settlements are entered into, more courts, at
both the district and appellate levels, will have to wrestle with the
antitrust issues such settlements raise. It is worth remembering that
the majority of circuits have not yet had an opportunity to opine on
the issue of reverse settlements. Their turn may yet come,203 possibly
leading to further debate - and perhaps confusion.
199.id. at 28 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. See S. 316, 110th Congo (as introduced in Senate, Jan. 17,2007). For a list of cosponsors, see Thomas, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
LegislativeData.phpry&n=Browse&c=110 (last visited May 6, 2011).
201. See Leibowitz, supra note 194.
202. See. e.g., Corporate Reform in America: A Chill in the Boardroom, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2009, at 69-70, available at http://www.economist.com/node/
15065509rystorLid=15065509 nT]he Department of Justice has promised to be more
aggressive in its enforcement of antitrust laws."); Editorial, Music inc. Gets Bigger, N.Y.
TiMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010102109/0pinion/
09tue2.html (stating that the Obama administration's "Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission have become more aggressive about questioning mergers and
challenging monopolies and anticompetitive behavior").
203. The most obvious candidate for the next court to opine on the matter is the Third
Circuit, as it will hear the appeal, if any, of the Provigil case. Furthermore, the Third Circuit
is home to Johnson & Johnson, Wyeth, and Merck, which are all headquartered in New
Jersey. Other circuits may face these questions as well. For instance, Abbott Laboratories is
headquartered in Illinois and Eli Lilly is in Indiana (both in the Seventh Circuit), Amgen
and Genentech are in California (in the Ninth Circuit), and other companies are similarly
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D. The Academic Debate

The dispute over the proper antitrust treatment of reverse
settlements has not escaped the academic world either. Much like the
political establishment, the academic world is split on the question of
whether these settlements can ever be anything other than anticompetitive, and, if so, under what conditions.
At one extreme lie Mr. Cristo fer Leffler and Professor Keith
Leffler, who argue that all reverse settlements should be per se
204
illegal. According to Messrs. Leffler:
[A] patent enjoys only a rebuttable, not a conclusive
presumption of validity. This probability of
invalidity has an economic value. Under the system
as created by Congress, the challenger has an
incentive to capture that value and that incentive
creates consumer benefit. In contrast, a payment by
the patent holder to the challenger captures the value
of the probability of patent invalidity. The agreement
between the patent holder and the challenger divides
the profits from agreed validity and thereby
eliminates any consumer benefit. Through an
agreement not to compete, the patent holder changes
the
congressionally
mandated
rebuttable
presumption of validity into a conclusive
presumption. When a patent holder thus enlarges the
reward granted to him by Congress, in the form of
paying a potential rival to confess validity, he and his
co-conspirator reduce efficiency and consumer
welfare and therefore commit a per se violation of
the antitrust laws?05

spread throughout the nation and various judicial circuits. It is quite possible, given the
location of these various companies, that the local circuit courts will yet have a chance to
opine on any deals that these companies may enter into.
204. See Cristofer Leffler & Keith Leffler, Settling the Controversy over Patent
Settlements: Payments by the Patent Holder Should Be Per Se JIlegal, in ANTITRUST LAW
AND ECONOMICS 475 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004).
205.Id. at 491; see also Herbert Hovenkamp et aI., Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1719, 1759 (2003) (arguing that reverse
settlements should be treated as unlawful if the amount of settlement is greater than "the
expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit;' essentially adopting
the FTC's per se rule); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J.
ECON. 391, 407-08 (2003) (stating that "a naked cash payment flowing from the
patentholder to the challenger (in excess of avoided litigation costs) is a clear signal that the
settlement is likely to be anticompetitive," and that "the FTC has a sound basis for its
skepticism about 'reverse cash payments' from the patentholder to the challenger").
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Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro take a similar approach, without
206
explicitly calling for a per se prohibition. Lemley and Shapiro argue
that patents do not, as conventionally thought, grant "the right to
exclude but rather a right to try to exclude.,,207 According to this
thinking, unless a patentee obtains a court order allowing him to
exclude a competitor by proving that the competitor is infringing a
valid patent, an agreement that excludes that competitor both enlarges
208
the scope of the patent and increases harm to consumers.
Lemley
and Shapiro do suggest that agreements to delay entry unaccompanied
by a reverse payment may indeed be pro-competitive,209 which may
be somewhat at odds with how the FTC would view these agreements.
On balance, though, the Lemley and Shapiro approach is similar to the
position espoused by Messrs. Leffler.
Professor Michael Carrier takes a somewhat more moderate
2lO
approach.
His approach is very similar to the one proposed by the
DO] in its Second Circuit brief in the Ciprofloxacin II case. Professor
Carrier argues that while a complete ban on reverse settlements is
over-inclusive and prohibits lawful activity,211 allowing unchecked (or
nearly unchecked) reverse settlements is under-inclusive and permits
unlawful restraints on trade?12 In order to balance these
considerations, and taking into account Hatch-Waxman's
competition-promoting goals and regulatory structure, Carrier
suggests that the payments by brand names to generics should be
presumptively illegal,213 but that the patentee be given an opportunity
to show, by "introduc[ing] arguments that have been offered in the
economic literature,,214 that the settlement appropriately "reflect[ ed]
an objective assessment of the patent's strength.,,215 Although Carrier
suggests his approach as a middle way, he admits that the presumptive
illegality may evolve, and "per se illegality might ultimately become a
more appropriate treatment,,216 should '1udicial experience
demonstrate[] that these arguments [from the economic literature] do
. f:act JUstl
. 'fy th e payments. ,,217
not m

206. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J.
(2005).
207.1d. at 75.
208. See id. at 93.
209. See id. at 93-94.
210. See Carrier, supra note 179, at 62.
211. See id. at 67-68.
212. See id.
213.1d.
214.1d. at 76.
215.1d.
216.1d.
217.1d.

EeoN.

PERSP. 75
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Yet another approach is offered by Marc G. Schildkraut, who
criticizes the "probabilistic patent" approach of Lemley and Shapiro
218
as well as the per se analysis of the FTC. In Schildkraut's view:
[E]xplicit or implicit reverse payments are not
necessarily anticompetitive. First, there are
conditions under which an explicit or implicit
"reverse" payment is necessary to settle patent
litigation. There may be a gap between the parties
that prevents settlement. This gap may be the result
of a difference in perceptions about the outcome of
the litigation or a difference in risk preferences.
Sometimes a reverse payment can close the gap
when it is impossible to close the gap by splitting
time because the time has a different value to each
party while the money has the same value.
Second, the reverse payment that settled the
litigation may result in entry before the probable date
of entry under the litigation. Such a settlement can
lead to early entry when the patent holder is risk
averse and willing to accept less than it expects to
obtain in litigation in order to settle. Or, the patent
holder's perceptions about the outcome of litigation
could simply be wrong. Under the circumstances,
settling
with
reverse
payments
may
be
.. 219
procompetltlve.
Schildkraut does argue that the settlements are extremely hard to
evaluate because of the uncertainties in litigation and the subjective
perceptions of the litigating parties. 22o Nonetheless, instead of "simply
giving up on settlements," he proposes that the parties to the
settlement obtain prior court approval and thus avail themselves of the
protections of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine?21 While on its face a
sensible proposal, it is hard to see what tools the court would use to
evaluate a settlement and its pro- or anti-competitive effects. The only
plausible way to do this would be essentially to try the validity of the
218. Marc G. Schi1dkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy,
71 ANTiTRUSTLJ. 1033 (2004).
219.id. at 1058 (footnote omitted).
220. See id. at 1052-55.
221.id. at 1068. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine arises from two Supreme Court cases,
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight. inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Under the doctrine, private
parties are immune from antitrust liability for injuries that may arise out of petitioning the
government and any state actions that result from such petitioning. See Schi1dkraut, supra
note 218, at 1057 (describing the doctrine).
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patent - an approach that Schildkraut rejects. 222 Thus, while his
observations about the effects of reverse settlements may well be
correct, it is not evident that courts can adjudicate the matter without
holding the very trial that the settling parties seek to avoid.
Professor Daniel Crane seeks to address the problem identified
223
above. He also proposes an inquiry into the ex ante expectations of
224
settling parties but suggests a tiered approach. Crane suggests that
whenever there is a preliminary injunction in place, a reverse
settlement should be presumptively lawful, as the presence of the
injunction indicates that the court believes that the patentee is likely to
225
succeed on the merits.
In the absence of a preliminary injunction,
Crane argues that a court should take a "quick look" into the strength
of the patentee's case - akin to a preliminary injunction hearingand approve a settlement if the court concludes that the patentee was
likely to succeed?26 Presumably, most settlements in the HatchWaxman context would fall in the latter category despite the presence
of a preliminary injunction. After all, in the Hatch-Waxman context, a
227
30-month preliminary injunction on FDA approval is automatic and
does not reflect any judicial determination of the patentee's likelihood
of success. Crane's proposal is further refined by his suggestion that
there be "a cap on the percentage of the patentee's monopoly rents
that it may pay the defendant to exit the market.,,228 According to
Crane:
A settlement in which the patentee is willing to pay
the alleged infringer a large percentage of its
monopoly rents from the patent in exchange for the
alleged infringer's promise to discontinue the
infringing use reflects a low probability that the
patent is valid or that the defendant's use is actually
. ~. . 229
mlflngmg.
Of particular relevance to the Hatch-Waxman settlements, Crane
proposes that agreements that impose barriers to third parties' ability

222. See Schildkraut, supra note 218, at 1054 (agreeing with the Valley Drug court that
"after-the-fact analysis of a settlement ... would undermine patent incentives").
223. See Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent infringement Lawsuits:
Antitrust Rules and Economic implications, 54 FLA. L. REv. 747(2002).
224. See id. at 779-96.
225.id. at 783-85.
226.id. at 785-88.
227. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (West 2011).
228. Crane, supra note 223, at 788.
229.id. This is indeed the same argument advanced by Lemley and Shapiro. See Lemley
& Shapiro, supra note 206, at 94. But see Thomas, supra note 24, at 37-38 (arguing that the
existence of reverse payments does not necessarily raise doubts about patent validity).
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to enter the market should receive enhanced scrutiny.230 Because a
number of the reverse settlements impose precisely these barriers (via
agreements not to waive or transfer the l80-day exclusivity period),
they would be subject to enhanced scrutiny. However, absent the
ability to enter into an agreement to "bank" it, the exclusivity period
may undermine the ability of the parties to settle. The patentee's
incentive will be reduced because it may fear further challenges from
more and more entities, while the generic's incentive could be
reduced because it would no longer be able to count on increased
profits during the l80-day period or from selling its exclusivity rights.
While Crane's approach is quite solicitous of reverse settlements,
it too presents significant problems. One of the main problems is
identified in the Schildkraut article. Under Crane's proposal, a court
would approve a settlement if it concludes that the patentee had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on merits. 231 Presumably, the
converse is true as well: that is, the court would reject the settlement if
such likelihood is not demonstrated. The problem is that a settlement
may be pro-competitive even when the likelihood of success is below
50%. As Schildkraut describes it:
Consider a case where the patent holder believes it
has only a 40 percent chance of prevailing. Being
risk averse, it settles the case without net
consideration by accepting 30 percent of the patent
life. Clearly, we have not violated the uncertain
competition standard. Yet, under the traditional
standard of proof, there is an argument that the
patent holder has violated the antitrust laws. Because
the patent holder is likely to lose the patent litigation,
a court might find that it has no legal basis for
excluding the alleged infringer, even an exclusion
that only lasts for 30 percent of the remaining patent
life. If the patent holder is forced to litigate,
however, there is a 40 percent chance it will prevail
and exclude the alleged infringer until the end of the
patent life. Although consumers would vote for the
compromise, we cannot honor that consumer
232
preference under the traditional standard ofproof.
As Schildkraut shows, reverse settlements may be pro-competitive
even in the face of relatively low likelihood of success in litigation.
230. See Crane, supra note 223, at 792-96.
231. See id. at 783-88 (suggesting that the courts evaluate success on the merits either

through the preliminary injunction proceedings or through the "quick look" proceedings).
232. Schildkraut, supra note 218, at 1054-55.
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Under Crane's approach, though, such settlements are likely to be
disallowed by the courts.
Some scholars, in particular Mark Lemley, Mark Janis, Herbert
Hovenkamp, and Scott Hemphill, have recognized the difficulty with
an antitrust approach that ultimately asks whether the patentee or the
challenger would have prevailed at trial. In order to solve the problem,
they suggest that the real question is not whether one side or another
would prevail, but whether there is a loss to the public of a chance
that the generic would prevail. 233 Although this approach is certainly
theoretically interesting, I am skeptical that it offers much help.
Almost no matter how strong a case one may have, there is always a
chance that one will lose at trial. This is true not just of
pharmaceutical litigation, but litigation in general. All settlements that
end litigation, then, extinguish these chances of loss. Thus, this
method is simply a new way of arguing that all reverse settlements
should be per se illegal, even if the authors disclaim the per se
approach. In response to this objection, Professor Hemphill makes a
more narrow argument. According to Hemphill, any paymentwhether a side deal as in the Provigil litigation, or a pure money
exchange, or even merely an agreement allowing the first filer to
retain exclusivity - results in a delayed market entry as compared to
234
what would be achieved without payment.
The problem is that all
settlements involve some exchange of benefits, as Hemphill himself
recognizes?35 If that alone were enough to condemn settlements, then
very few would survive an antitrust attack. 236 Ultimately, Hemphill's
argument, much like that of Lemley, Shapiro, Hovenkamp, and Janis,
is predicated on the idea that patent validity is merely
"probabilistic.,,237 I, on the other hand, tend to agree with Kevin
McDonald that there is no reason to treat patents as any more
"probabilistic" than any other form of property.238 For these reasons,
Hemphill's supposedly more nuanced approach is also, in my view,
not up to the task of solving the reverse settlement problems.
Although the above discussion is not an exhaustive compendium
of various academic views and approaches to the problem of reverse
settlements, it is a fair representation of the divergent positions taken
233. See c. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1553, 1557 (2006) [hereinafter Hemphill,
Paying for Delay]; Hovenkamp et aI., supra note 205, at 1722 C[T]he outcome of a
settlement agreement that would otherwise produce an antitrust violation might be no more
anticompetitive than the outcome of litigation.").
234. See Hemphill, Payingfor Delay, supra note 233.
235. See id. at 1576-77.
236. See id.; Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Antitrust: On
"Probabilistic" Patent Rights and False Positives, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 68,68-69.
237. See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 233, at 1589; Lemley & Shapiro, supra
note 206; see also Hovenkamp et aI., supra note 205, at 1759.
238. See McDonald, supra note 236, at 71.
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by some eminent scholars. This lack of agreement in academia,
Congress, the courts, and the Executive Branch leads me to conclude
that a new approach is needed - one that would be based in patent
law and serve the stated goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act. It is to this
proposal that I now turn.

V. SOLVING A PATENT PROBLEM THROUGH PATENT LAW
As can be seen from the above disagreements, and as the courts
and scholars have explicitly and repeatedly recognized, there is
inherent and constant tension between antitrust law and patent law.
While it is "well settled that the possession of a valid patent or patents
does not give the patentee any exemption from the provisions of the
Sherman Act,,,239 it is equally true that "the essence of a patent grant
is the right to exclude others.,,24o Of course, to be legitimate, the
241
exclusion must be only of a product that infringes a valid patent.
The question then ultimately turns on the validity of a patent, not on
any payment from the patentee to the challenger. Even those who
have advocated for a per se rule against reverse settlements have not
suggested that such payments would be illegal if the patent were
242
adjudged to be valid and infringed.
The reason why some seek to
ban reverse settlements is because they prevent adjudication of the
patents and thus allow a patentee to exclude on the basis of what
243
could be an invalid patent.
If the worry is that brand-name
manufacturers are enforcing invalid patents through reverse
settlements, the best way to address the problem is through patent law
itself.
In enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress sought both to
promote innovation by extending the terms of the patents on
pharmaceuticals and to promote competition from lower cost generic
alternatives?44 Additionally, as far back as 1892, the Supreme Court
held that "[i]t is as important to the public that competition should not
be repressed by worthless patents.,,245 Presuming, as canons of
statutory construction require, that Congress legislated with full
knowledge of the state of the law then extant,246 it follows that one of
239. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948).
240. Dawson Chern. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,215 (1980).
241. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 206, at 93.
242. Of course, if that were to occur, there would no longer be any need for such
payments. Regardless, none of the reverse settlement critics have advanced the antitrust
argument so far as to say that a hypothetical patentee with a judicially "confirmed" patent
would be prohibited from paying a generic manufacturer whatever sums he wishes.
243. See. e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 206, at 93.
244. See supra Part 1l.A.
245. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).
246. See. e.g., United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347, 356-57 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
("Congress is presumed to preserve, not abrogate, the background understandings against
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the purposes for which Congress enacted Paragraph IV was to
encourage competition through the removal of "worthless patents" on
pharmaceutical products. Congress thus constructed a system where
competitors who would attempt to clear worthless patents would be
rewarded. It is with reference to these goals that the solution to the
problem of reverse settlements should be crafted. Restricting or even
banning settlements simply does not remove worthless patents from
the field. At most, banning the settlements would push more disputes
into litigation where the outcome is far from certain. Some of the
patents would likely be invalidated, thus serving the Hatch-Waxman
Act's "clearing" goal. Others would be upheld, and the entry of the
generic drug would be delayed beyond the time that could have been
agreed upon between the parties, thus failing the Act's goals of
increased competition and reduced prices. Simply put, the antitrust
solution is a very imperfect tool to address the problem of reverse
settlements and an even more imperfect tool to advance the goals
Congress had in mind in enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act. Patent law,
the very tool Congress used to create the Hatch-Waxman Act, is a far
better instrument to address these issues.
A. Patent Reexamination

After a patent issues, it is presumed valid. 247 The presumption,
however, can be overcome during litigation by the accused
infringer. 248 Of course, in the context of reverse settlements, the
litigation is avoided and that avenue is foreclosed. The other option is
reexamination of the patent by the PTa. Reexamination is exactly
what it sounds like - an examination of the patent anew. 249 The
major difference between a district court trial and a reexamination by
the PTa is that the patent does not enjoy any presumption of validity
250
during a reexamination process.
Rather, the reexamination departs
from the same starting point as the original examination:

which it legislates. .
Congress is presumed to be aware of established practices and
authoritative interpretations ofthe coordinate branches.").
247.35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
248. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
('"A patent is presumed to be valid, and this presumption only can be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary." (citation omitted)).
249. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2006) (stating that "reexamination will be conducted
according to the procedures established for initial examination"); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg,
849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("In a reexamination proceeding ... the 'focus' of the
reexamination 'returns essentially to that present in an initial examination.'" (quoting in re
Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985»).
250. Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1427 ("In a reexamination proceeding, on the other hand, there
is no presumption of validity .... ").
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[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of
the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a
prima facie case of unpatentability. If that burden is
met, the burden of coming forward with evidence or
argument shifts to the applicant.
After evidence or argument is submitted by the
applicant in response, patentability is determined on
the totality of the record, by a preponderance of
evidence ... ?51
There are two types of reexamination procedures: ex parte
. . 252 and 'lllter partes reexamlllatlOn.·
. . 253 The major
.
reexamlllatlOn
difference between the two procedures is that during an inter partes
reexamination, the third party that requested the patent be reexamined
can participate in the process and appeal an unfavorable decision to
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BP AI"), and then to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 254 In other words,
the inter partes reexamination is in many ways similar to a proceeding
in the district court and may be used in lieu thereof.255 The inter partes
procedure presumes that there is a third party opposing the validity of
the issued patent and willing to convince the PTa of the correctness
of its views. Of course, if post-Paragraph IV certification parties enter
into a settlement, it is unlikely that there will remain an entity
interested in prosecuting the invalidity argument in the PTa. The
following discussion thus focuses on the ex parte reexamination.
However, the availability of an inter partes exam is important and will
be discussed in Part VI.D, infra.
Section 302 of the Patent Act authorizes "[a]ny person at any time
[to] file a request for reexamination by the Office of any claim of a
patent on the basis of any prior art.,,256 The person must identity the
prior art that he believes is relevant to the question of patentability
and explain why the cited art raises a "substantial new question of
patentability. ,,257 If the Director 0 f the Patent Office determines that a
"substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of a
patent is raised, the determination will include an order for
251. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
252. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (2006).
253. See id. §§ 311-18.
254.Id. § 315(b). In an ex parte reexamination, only the applicant is entitled to appeal an
adverse decision. See id. § 306.
255. See id. § 314 (describing the requirement of serving each document on the opposing
party and allowing both the patent owner and the third party requester to file written
responses and arguments with the Patent Office); id. § 315 (allowing both the patent owner
and the third party requester to appeal unfavorable decisions).
256.Id. § 302.
257.Id. § 303; see also id. § 302.
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reexamination of the patent for resolution of the question.',258 The
examination proceeds much like the initial examination, except it is
generally conducted by senior examiners who were uninvolved with
259
the original examination. Once the examiner makes a final decision,
a patent owner may appeal any unfavorable ruling to the BPAI or the
Federal Circuit (as he would have been able to do during the original
examination)?60 Ultimately, once the reexamination is concluded, a
reexamination certificate is issued either confirming the claims,
canceling them, amending them to narrow their scope, or a
combination thereof.261
In addition to permitting any third party to file requests, the
regulations promulgated under the statute permit the Director to order
reexamination on his own initiative. 262 "Such reexamination may be
ordered at any time during the period of enforceability of the
patent.,,263 Although the PTO has the authority to order a
reexamination at any time, its own rules specify that "[a] decision to
order reexamination at the Director's initiative is, however, rare. Only
in compelling circumstances, after a review of all the facts concerning
the patent, would such a decision be made.,,264 If the decision is made,
the reexamination proceeds as any other reexamination would.
It is important to understand that reexamination is ordered only
when there is a "substantial new question of patentability." That is a
threshold inquiry.265 The inquiry, however, is not limited to focusing
on prior art that was unavailable to the PTO during the initial
examination. The statute permits for reexamination "on the basis of
any prior art.,,266 This means that even if a given piece of prior art was
considered during the initial application, it could still raise a
"substantial new question of patentability," if for instance the Director
258.1d. § 304.
259. See MPEP § 2236 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010).
260.35 U.S.C. § 306.
261. See id. § 305 ('"No proposed amended or new claim enlarging the scope of a claim
of the patent will be permitted in a reexamination proceeding under this chapter."); id. § 307
('"[T]he Director will issue and publish a certificate canceling any claim of the patent finally
determined to be unpatentable, confirming any claim of the patent determined to be
patentable, and incorporating in the patent any proposed amended or new claim determined
to be patentable. ").
262. See id. § 303(a) ('"On his own initiative, and any time, the Director may determine
whether a substantial new question of patentability is raised by patents and publications
discovered by him .... "); 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2010).
263. MPEP § 2239 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010).
264.1d. While the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures does not delineate what
constitutes "compelling circumstances," the Director has previously ordered reexamination
in high profile cases. See Troy L. Gwartney, Note, Harmonizing the ExciusionaJY Rights of
Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1395, 1407-08 (2009)
(describing the Patent Office's sua sponte reexamination and ultimate rejection of patents
that were involved in the controversial Blackberry litigation).
265. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 303-04.
266.1d. § 302.
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determines that the initial examination did not fully or properly
consider that piece of evidence. In other words, no new evidence
needs to be cited to the PTO in order for the reexamination to be
ordered.
B. Utilizing the Reexamination Process

The reason patentees choose to enter into reverse settlements with
the accused infringers is because of a chance that at trial the patent
may be found invalid?67 If a patentee had a 100% chance of winning
in court, there would be no reason at all to settle,268 except in those
cases where the cost of litigation itself exceeds the value of injunctive
relief. Given the money at stake in pharmaceutical litigation, the cases
where favorable judgment is of little worth to the patentee can be
expected to be exceedingly rare. It has been conceded, even by those
who find no antitrust fault with reverse settlements, that "the size of
the payment to refrain from competing, sometimes called a 'reverse
payment' or an 'exit payment,' raises the suspicion that the parties
lacked faith in the validity of the patent.,,269 Although courts have
rejected an approach through which the size of the settlement would
be considered an admission of the patent's invalidity, they agree that
the relative strength of the patent is one of the important
considerations in deciding whether and on what terms to settle the
·· . 270
1ItlgatlOn.
Using the above insight, I propose a different approach to the
problem of reverse settlements - one that takes into account the size
of the settlement, but one that does not sound in antitrust law, nor
require either the courts or administrative agencies to engage in post
hoc evaluations of patents' strengths or parties' ex ante expectations.
Instead, reverse settlements that involve payments of more than
reasonable litigation expenses should be treated as a signal to the
Patent Office that private parties (the patentee and the generic
challenger) have some doubts about the strength of the patent at issue.
If the size of the settlement exceeds reasonable litigation costs and
cross-license fees, it would indicate that the doubts are
"substantial" - in other words, that there exists in the minds of the
parties a "substantial new question of patentability" of the patent in

267. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
268. See Graham, supra note 20, at 445 n.143; Hovenkamp et aI., supra note 205, at
1758-59.
269. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2003).
270. See. e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1073-74 ("It is
uncontested that parties settle cases based on their perceived risk of prevailing in and losing
the litigation .... Assuming the patent is reasonably strong, and the parties then settled
under this scenario, the money most probably would flow from the infringers to
Schering .... ").
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suit. The Patent Office can then decide whether such question indeed
exists, and if so, order the patent into reexamination proceedings.
If a reexamination is triggered, the Patent Office can then use its
expertise to determine whether the claims are valid. If it determines
that they are, it would necessarily follow that the settlement was
proper, for the exclusion of the generic would not be the result of an
illegal payment, but the result of the scope of a now-confirmed valid
patent. Alternatively, should the PTO reject the claims, thus removing
the patentee's ability to enforce a now-nonexistent patent, the market
would become open to any other generic manufacturer that wished to
enter it. All a generic manufacturer would need to do is file an ANDA
with Paragraph I certification, certifYing that no patent covers the drug
in question. 271 Assuming that the generic would be able to satisfY the
bioequivalence requirements,272 nothing would stand in the way of the
FDA approving the generic version and that version entering the
273
market to the benefit of consumers.
In this way, the consumerprotection purposes of antitrust law would be served. So too would be
the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act, as the procedure would both
allow the quicker entry of the generic drugs and the removal of
worthless patents from the public sphere.
One of the fundamental advantages of the proposed approach is
that it does not depend on adversarial litigation or any particular party
challenging a patent. Because the PTO conducts its reexamination ex
274
upon either its own motion or following a submission from
parte
"any person," the patentee cannot possibly contract away this
procedure, unlike the judicial inquiry, which can only proceed when
there is a "case or controversy.,,275 Consequently, it would be
impossible for the patentee and the generic challenger to collude in
order to keep an invalid patent on the market while splitting the supracompetitive profits.

271. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (West 2011).
272. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
273. The first filer may still be able to enjoy a l80-day marketing exclusivity period, but
even so, the market would be open at worst 180 days later rather than a number of years
later. Alternatively, the l80-day period may be forfeited under the MMA.Ifthe underlying
patent was invalid, it would follow that the settlement was anti-competitive, and therefore
likely to have violated antitrust laws. Under the MMA's amendments, a generic that enters
into a settlement that is found to violate antitrust laws forfeits its l80-day exclusivity period.
21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(D).
274. As discussed earlier, there is a provision of inter partes reexamination, but it need
not be utilized in order to engage in the reexamination. See supra notes 253-55 and
accompanying text.
275. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
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C. The Proposed Procedure

If reverse settlements are to lead to patent reexamination, there
must be a set of rules that would dictate when the settlements would
trigger the reexamination, who would serve as the reviewing authority
for the trigger, and what information should be available to that
authority. Adopting a per se rule that would require a reexamination
of all patents subject to reverse settlements would be inconsistent with
the understanding that some settlements are not only economically
beneficial to the settling parties and to consumers, but do not betray
any doubt on the part of the patentee about the patent's strength. 276
The premise of the system that I am proposing, on the other hand, is
that certain settlements do raise a "substantial new question of
patentability" regarding the patents in suit. Additionally, the presence
of a "substantial new question" is a statutory requirement for
277
reexamination.
Even the FTC, with its uncompromising position,
realizes that some reverse settlements do not point to any doubts about
patent validity.278
At the same time, judging the appropriateness of a settlement's
size can only be accomplished by reference to the value of the
underlying patent: the stronger the patent, the more valuable it is, and
therefore, the larger the settlement will be. If these considerations had
to be examined prior to reexamination proceedings, there would
essentially be two separate inquiries into the strength of the patent,
making the system too unwieldy and unpredictable.
In my view, any reverse settlement where the amount of money
paid to the generic challenger exceeds reasonable litigation costs plus
reasonable payments for any cross-licenses that are part of the
agreement should be referred to the PTO. That, however, leaves open
the question of valuating the cost of litigation and side deals.
Avoiding protracted adjudication over this issue is important if the
reexamination solution to the reverse settlement problem is to work.
Consequently, I would impose an approach similar to that advocated
by the FTC and Professor Hemphill,279 albeit in a different contextpresuming that every settlement above a certain amount is a signal
that there exists a substantial new question of patentability. I would
adjust the FTC's presumption to state that any settlement in excess of
$2 million will be presumed to raise enough substantial new questions

276. See Thomas, supra note 24, at 37-38.
277. 35 U.S.C. §§ 303-04 (2006).
278. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 2005)
(describing the FTC's position that settlements which do not exceed the cost of litigation are
not anti-competitive, as long as such litigation costs are below $2 million).
279. See id. (stating that FTC would presume all settlements over $2 million to be in
violation of antitrust laws); Hemphill, supra note I, at 636.
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280
of patentability to trigger the reexamination request. Additionally, I
agree with Professor Hemphill that some (though not all) crosslicensing deals may also be little more than a convenient cover for an
281
otherwise anti-competitive settlement.
To police against that, I
would suggest that a second-level presumption be created: that any
reverse settlement involving a cross-licensing side deal also be
presumed to raise a substantial new question of patentability if the
282
payments under the side agreement exceed some specified amount.
Faced with settlements that exceed the limits set in regulations,
the FTC will be able to request that the PTO reexamine the patent
subject to the settlement. The PTO will then be able to consider, under
its regular procedure, whether there are indeed "substantial new
questions of patentability" and, if so, order the patent into a full
reexamination. In determining whether such questions exist, the PTO
will be able to rely on the documentation compiled and arguments
made by the generic manufacturer in support of its ANDA Paragraph
IV filing. I would therefore propose that whenever reverse settlements
are concluded, such information be turned over to the PTO. This
should not place a significant burden on the generic manufacturer.
The Hatch-Waxman Act (as amended by the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003) already requires
any applicant that files an ANDA under Paragraph IV to provide "a
detailed statement of the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the
applicant that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed.,,283 Thus,
the generic manufacturer must have an opinion of counsel on the
validity of the patent that is being challenged under Paragraph IV. The
opinion, which must be prepared in good faith,284 would identifY a
relevant basis for invalidating the patent.

280. The actual dollar amount can be adjusted as needed if and when the average cost of
litigation changes.
281. See Hemphill, supra note I, at 632.
282. I leave the actual dollar value to those more skilled in economic valuation of patents
and licenses; however, a $20 million cap does not seem unreasonable. Relatedly, I would
reject Hemphill's suggestion that all settlements that allow the challenger to keep the 180day exclusivity period be treated in the same way as other reverse settlements, even if no
money exchanges hands. See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 233, at 1588-94. In
Hemphill's view, because the retained exclusivity confers a potentially multi-million dollar
benefit on the generic, it functions in exactly the same way as a payment.ld. at 1560. The
problem is that in such a situation, the patentee is not giving up anything of value.
Consequently, a settlement where the generic is simply allowed to retain the exclusivity
period does not signal that the patentee has substantial questions about the patentability of
its invention.
283.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(1l) (West 2011).
284. See Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 375
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), ajj'd, 231 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ('"In filing its paragraph IV
certification along with its ANDA, Schein represented that 'in the opinion of the applicant
and to the best of its knowledge' the ... patent was invalid. However, the patent law
imposes an affirmative duty of due care on one making such an assertion, and this standard
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The only change that my proposal would require is that the
opinion be shared not just with the patentee and the FDA, but also
with the PTa. The law already requires the settling parties to notity
the FTC whenever they enter into reverse settlements and to file the
285
full text of the agreement with the FTC.
Requiring the parties to
also file an already-prepared opinion of counsel identitying the basis
for the claims of invalidity would not impose any additional burden
on either party. The opinion would identity for the Director the "new
questions of patentability" and be buttressed by the finding that the
size of the settlement exceeds the reasonable cost of litigation plus the
reasonable value of any cross-licenses. Armed with this evidence, the
PTa would determine, applying current statutory rules, whether it
should proceed to reexamination. The PTa would make that decision
aided by, but independent of, the opinion of counsel that was
submitted with the initial Paragraph IV certification and any other
documents that became available to the challenger during discovery.
The reexamination itself would not automatically follow a reverse
settlement. Rather, the settlement would only require the PTa to
consider whether a full reexamination should be ordered.
In short, the system that I propose would utilize the PTa's
existing authority to reexamine patents, and would simply focus the
PTa's attention on those patents that the patentee and a competitor,
through their behavior, have identified as raising substantial new
questions of patentability. As I describe in the following Part, my
proposal would broaden the scope of reexamination, so that all
questions of validity - not just those based on prior art - could be
addressed.

VI.

RESPONSES TO COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

The patent solution to the problem of reverse settlements is, in my
view, a better approach than the blunt tool of antitrust law. However,
this approach is not free of its own potential shortcomings. I will
address a few of these shortcomings and suggest how the law should
be fine-tuned in order to mitigate these problems.
A. Limited Reexamination Trigger
Currently, reexaminations may be conducted only when certain
prior art can be shown to invalidate the patent. 286 In other words,
is applied in determining if one such as Schein had an objective good faith basis for such
action." (citation omitted).
285. MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111-18, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
286. See Scope of Reexamination in Ex Parte Reexamination Proceedings, 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.552 (2010); MPEP § 2258 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010).
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reexamination covers only § 102 (anticipation)287 and § 103
(obviousness)288 rejections. At trial, on the other hand, an issued
patent can be attacked on other grounds, such as § 112 (lack of written
description or enablement),289 double patenting,290 or inequitable
291
conduct in front of the PTO during the original prosecution. None
of these grounds are cause for reexamination in the PTO,292 yet all of
these grounds would be part of the settlement calculus. A patent
holder may legitimately fear losing a case on the grounds of
inequitable conduct or lack of enablement and enter into a reverse
settlement in order to avoid that prospect. The settlement is meant to
avoid a likely invalidation of the patent, and yet, under the present
law, the PTO would be powerless to reexamine the patent as it is not
invalidated by any prior art. This calls for a change in the
reexamination procedures. In order for reexamination to be an
effective policing tool against improper settlements, the PTO must be
given authority to order a patent into reexamination for any
potentially invalidating reason. In determining whether the patent
ought to be reexamined, it should make no difference whether the
patent fails to comply with Section 102 or Section 112 of the Patent
Act. Any failure to comply with the Act's requirements should be
sufficient to remove the patent from the public sphere. The authority
to order patents into reexamination for reasons other than prior art
invalidation would not change the reexamination process itself. Once
the patent enters the process, it should no longer matter why it did so.
During the process it would be treated like every other patent
application and subjected to the same full set of requirements.
The burden on the PTO should not noticeably increase if the
scope of its authority to order a patent for reexamination is broadened.
First, the PTO already has a process to "reexamine" patents that fail
the written description or specification requirements. Section 251 of
the Patent Act permits correction of a patent through a reissue
"[ w ]henever any patent is, through error without any deceptive
intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of
a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee
287.35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
288.1d. § 103.
289.1d. § 112; see, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 943 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (affirming lower court finding that a patent was invalid due to lack of
enablement).
290. See. e.g., Sun Pharm. Indus. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (discussing the prohibition on double patenting).
29l. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
('"[W]e are compelled to conclude that 'inequitable conduct' occurred. Accordingly, all
claims of the patent must be held unenforceable.").
292. MPEP § 2258 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) ('"Issues other than those indicated in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section [both dealing only with printed prior art] will not be
resolved in a reexamination proceeding.").
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claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent. ,,293
The patentee can correct a written description or enablement problem
through a reissue. 294 Moreover, until 1988, the PTO examined reissue
applications for conformance with the duty of disclosure?95 This
shows that the PTO is fully capable of addressing inequitable conduct
issues in post-grant review.
The current statutory scheme governing reissue applications only
permits the patent owner himself to request such proceedings?96 In
contrast to the reexamination process, neither the Director of the PTO
nor a third party may request reissue proceedings. That limitation
presents a serious obstacle to accomplishing full review of a
pharmaceutical patent within the PTO. In order for my proposed
scheme to work, the PTO must be given the authority to review the
patent for all potential problems and not just those that can currently
be reviewed in the reexamination proceedings. Congress is presently
considering such an authority, albeit in a different context. The
pending Patent Reform bill would permit any third party to request,
and the PTO to conduct, post-grant review "on any ground that could
be raised under section 282 (relating to invalidity of the patent or any
claim).,,297 If this same mechanism, together with resumption of
review for compliance with the duty of disclosure, is adopted for the
settlement review process that I am advocating, it would permit the
PTO to fully examine the patent. This will preclude the possibility of
reverse settlements serving as a shield against a finding of invalidity
on grounds other than anticipation or obviousness.
B. Non-infringement Paragraph IV Certification

The Paragraph IV certification comes in two varieties: the noninfringement claim and the invalidity claim?98 Submitting an ANDA
with either claim puts the first entrant in the position of claiming the
293.35 U.S.C. § 251.
294. See in re Amos, 953 F.2d 613, 618 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the reissue
application was examined for compliance with the enablement and written description
requirements, and that those requirements were satisfied).
295. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
IMPLEMENTATION OF 37 CFR 1.56, 1095 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 16 (Oct. 11,
1988); see also Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of
u.s. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition - and Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 77 n.51 (1998). As of 1988, the Patent Office has abandoned the
practice and now treats as dispositive the applicant's affidavit that the mistake sought to be
corrected in the reissue process was not a result ofa deceptive intent. MPEP § 1448 (8th ed.
Rev. 8, July 2010) (explaining that ·'[t]he Office no longer investigates or rejects reissue
applications under 37 CFR 1.56," which imposes a duty of disclosure).
296.35 U.S.C. § 251.
297. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, l1lth Congo § 5(f)(1) (as reported by S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Apr. 2,2009) (emphasis added).
298.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(lV) (West 2011).
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ISO-day exclusivity period?99 Yet, if the basis for the approval of the
generic drug is only a finding of non-infringement, then the patent
remains valid as against future entrants. If a Paragraph IV certification
on the basis of invalidity is followed by a reverse settlement, there
would be no advantage for subsequent entrants to challenge the
patent, for they will not be entitled to the ISO-day exclusivity period.
N either would there be a basis for the PTO to reexamine the patent,
for there will be no opinion of counsel that the patent is in any way
invalid. Such an outcome arguably presents a problem because it
allows the parties to collude in order to avoid judicial determination of
non-infringement. Avoidance of such a determination may improperly
preserve a broader scope of exclusivity than the patent itself warrants.
In other words, even though the patent claims by themselves only
permit the patentee to exclude certain products, a reverse settlement
that avoids the finding of non-infringement effectively permits the
exclusion of additional products.
The proposal I layout does not help solve the problem of reverse
settlements following the certification of non-infringement, whereas
the antitrust-based approach would. Although that is certainly a
drawback to my solution, I am not convinced that it is a major one.
Even though the same consequences flow from certification of noninfringement and certification of invalidity, I suggest that the
fundamental problem with reverse settlements is not a delay in the
market entry of certain generic drugs, but that settlements may stifle
innovation by permitting continued occupation of the public sphere by
300
worthless patents. No such problem presents itself when the generic
manufacturer does not challenge the validity of the patent, but rather
certifies non-infringement only. Furthermore, it is likely that the
majority of challenges contest validity rather than non301
infringement. Because any ANDA filer has to show that the generic
drug it seeks to market is bioequivalent - in other words, essentially
the same as the patented drug - it is very likely that the generic
version would read on the patent. As a result, I am not overly
concerned about non-infringement Paragraph IV certifications being
used as a prelude to anti-competitive reverse settlements. At the same
299.1d. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(l).
300. To be sure, the delay in market entry for lower cost generics does hurt consumers as
it increases the price of medical care. Nonetheless, the delay in and of itself does not have
an impact on the patent and innovation system as a whole. Furthermore, the cost to
consumers is not that high. See Tracy L. Regan, Generic Entry. Price Competition, and
Market Segmentation in the Prescription Drug Market, 26 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 930, 946
('"While it is reasonable to expect that a branded drug's price would be higher than those of
its generic competitors, branded firms are often able to maintain, or in some instances even
to raise, their prices when confronted with generic entry into their market.").
301. Although the collection and analysis of data on the types of Paragraph IV challenges
being pursued is not within the scope of this Article, I intend to collect and analyze such
data in a follow-up piece to the present Article.
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time, the question of such certifications' frequency certainly bears
more investigation.
C. Undermining Settlements

Another possible objection to my approach is that it would
dissuade parties from entering into settlements, thus undermining the
judicial policy of favoring out-of-court settlements?02 The argument
is that if every settlement is subject to review and potential patent
invalidation through the reexamination process, patentees will be
dissuaded from entering settlements because they will lose the
certainty that their property rights will remain intact. Even though the
argument is appealing on the surface, it does not withstand close
scrutiny.
As an initial matter, it should be observed that some companies
voluntarily request reexamination of their patents even after entering
into reverse settlements?03 This practice suggests that the prospect of
reexamination does not necessarily inhibit or undermine the
conclusion of settlements between patentees and generic
manufacturers. There is little reason to believe then that the
mechanism I am proposing would change this dynamic.
Fundamentally, the threat of patent reexamination following
reverse settlements will not affect patentees' desire to enter into
settlements because my proposal does not create any new significant
threat for the patentees. Recall that at present, the Director can, sua
sponte, order any patent into reexamination at any time upon
concluding that there exists a substantial new question of patentability
in light of prior art?04 All patents, including pharmaceutical patents,
are subject to this threat of reexamination. 305 The presence or absence
of a settlement agreement does not affect the Director's ability to
exercise reexamination authority. My proposal would bring only
moderate changes to the Director's ability to exercise this alreadyexistent power. First, the Director would have access to the research
compiled by the generic applicant as part of the ANDA application
process. Access to this research, in and of itself, should not give the
patentee any qualms, for it merely eases the work that the PTO can do
of its own volition. Such access does not in any way prejudice the
302. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005) ('"The
general policy of the law is to favor the settlement of litigation, and the policy extends to the
settlement of patent infringement suits.").
303. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXPARlb" REEXAMINATION FILING DATA
I (2010) [hereinafter REEXAMINATION FILING DATA], available at http://reexamcenter.com/
wp-content/uploads/2009/08/2010-06-30-Ex-Parte.pdf (noting that 34% of all requests are
filed by the applicants themselves).
304.35 U.S.C. § 304 (2006).
305.1d.
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patentee, as all of the information that the ANDA filer gathers is
presumably public. In essence, granting the PTO access to such
research is no different than the PTO hiring in-house reviewers to
continuously review issued patents and advise the Director if a
reexamination ought to be ordered. The PTO has such authority
306
presently, although it almost never chooses to exercise it.
The second change in the Director's authority to order
reexamination would be slightly more significant. Under my proposal,
the authority would be moderately expanded to permit reexamination
not just on the basis of prior art, but on any basis that would raise new
and substantial questions of patentability.307 While this would extend
the overall vulnerability of patents to reexamination, it would not
fundamentally change the nature or strength of the patentee's rights.
Furthermore, my proposal for extending the scope of reexamination
proceedings is not limited to those instances where proceedings are a
result of the Hatch-Waxman process. Rather, it is my view that the
Director ought to be able to order a reexamination - and, if
necessary, to reject claims - whenever there is a substantial new
question of patentability of whatever variety.308 If that were the case,
again, the presence of a reverse settlement would not in any way
change the Director's authority or ability to reexamine a patent. The
reverse settlement would simply serve as a triggering event for the
Director to determine whether a substantial new question of
patentability exists. Whether such a question exists, though, will be
determined not based on the fact that two parties reached a settlement,
but on the patent's compliance with the legal requirements of the
Patent Act.
D. Amendments in Reexamination

Most of the patents that enter reexamination do not emerge from
the process unchanged. Of the patents that enter reexamination, less
than a quarter exit with all their claims confirmed, and twelve percent
309
of reexaminations result in all claims being cancelled.
The vast
majority of reexaminations (65%) result in changes to the claims?lO
This tendency potentially presents a problem. If a patent subjected to
a reexamination is neither fully confirmed nor fully cancelled, but
306. See supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
307. See supra Part VI.A.
308. Indeed, the currently pending Patent Reform Act would confer such power on the
Patent Office, albeit limited to the first nine months post-issuance. Patent Reform Act of
2009, S. 515, lllth Congo § 5(f)(1) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2,
2009).
309. REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 303, at 2.
31O.1d. These numbers do not depend significantly on who requested the
reexamination - whether the patentee, the Director, or a third party.
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rather reissued with different claims, the reexamination may not have
served the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act, but merely replaced
one questionable patent with another. Since the amended claims
would not have been reviewed for weakness and invalidity by any
opposing counsel, there is a danger that these claims would be only
marginally stronger than the original claims. Such a situation would
result in no improvement over the current condition where a patentee
is able to pay the challenger in order to forego the challenge and
preserve a questionable patent.
While there is no perfect response to the above objection, several
factors mitigate the seriousness of the problem. First, a reexamined
patent, even if amended, would have gone through the examination
process not once, but twice. An additional examination inherently
increases the odds that the final amended claims are valid. This is
particularly true given that reexaminations are conducted by senior
examiners who are more experienced,3ll and therefore presumably
better at evaluating and assessing patent applications. An application
that has gone through the rigorous reexamination process is much less
likely to be vulnerable to an invalidity challenge, especially if the
reexamination evaluates not just novelty, but full compliance with the
requirements of the Patent Act, as I propose. Second, the
reexamination proceedings do not permit broadening of claims; rather,
the patentee is only permitted to narrow the claims further. I do not
propose to change this limitation. Since the claims can only be
narrower in scope, and because narrower claims necessarily sweep
less prior art into their ambit, they will more likely survive a validity
challenge.
Furthermore, should additional protection against issuing dubious
amended claims be desired, the reexamination procedure itself can be
adjusted. The Patent Office could be required to permit third parties to
comment on the reexamination proceedings. There already exists an
opportunity for inter partes reexamination that in some ways
resembles adversarial trial proceedings. However, in the inter partes
proceedings as currently constituted, only the patentee and the third
party that requested the reexamination can submit information and
arguments to the PTO. Any interested member of the public could be
allowed to comment on the reexamination process following a reverse
settlement. Much of the information is already publicly available
through the PTO' s Patent Application Information Retrieval ("PAIR")
system.312 All that would be required is to permit the public to submit
arguments to the PTO as to why the claims, even as amended, should
not issue. If the examiner considers the arguments and then issues the
claims anyway, it would provide considerable evidence that the
311. See MPEP § 2236 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010).
312. See id. § 2232.
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amended claims are indeed valid and that the goals of Hatch-Waxman
are satisfied. Similar approaches have been proposed for all patent
examination proceedings?l3 The resolution of a debate over whether
all examination should be opened for public input is beyond the scope
of this Article. However, opening the reexamination proceedings for
public participation would lessen any concern, to the extent that such
concern exists, that the patent reexamination procedure following a
reverse settlement might be gamed in such a way as to maintain
invalid patents in the public sphere.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Reverse settlements between pharmaceutical companies present a
challenge to the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Settlements that
seek to insulate an invalid patent from challenge prevent consumers
from benefiting from reduced generic prices and retard innovation by
others. At the same time, legitimate settlements are economically
efficient and have the added benefit of easing the strain on a severely
overburdened judicial system. Because some of the settlements may
be beneficial, it makes little sense to adopt a blanket ban on the
practice as has been proposed by some members of Congress. This is
especially true given that many of these settlements involve various
cross-licenses, making it extraordinarily difficult to determine which
settlements would be legal and which would not. Antitrust law is also
an imperfect solution to the problem, as it either imposes a blanket
ban on such settlements or requires collateral litigation over patent
validity.
The Hatch-Waxman Act has worked well for many years because
it used amendments to patent law to fix a problem in patent law. Since
its original enactment, the new problem of reverse settlement has
arisen. Up until now, the courts, the Executive Branch, Congress, and
academia have all tried to resolve the issue through the application of
ill-fitting antitrust law. This approach is poorly suited for what
ultimately is a patent law problem. By expanding the scope of the
Patent Office's reexamination authority, and by assigning the task of
evaluating the ultimate validity of questionable patents to the agency
with expertise in patent law, the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act and
the ability of parties to enter into beneficial and legitimate settlements
will both be preserved. It is through this system that consumers of
drugs and medical devices would derive the most benefit.

313. See S. 23, 112th Congo § 5 (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8,2011) (providing for postgrant review that can be initiated by any member ofthe public on any invalidity grounds).

